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Abstract 
 
The manifestation of terrorism on the African continent has increasingly 
become a major emerging and evolving security concern. Based on the number 
of incidents happening on the continent, it is evident that the approach in 
addressing this phenomenon needs to be rethought, restrategised and 
redesigned in order to maximise the effect of current counter interventions by 
different organisations. At the centre of terrorism is the financing thereof. The 
bulk of this study will focus on the financing of terrorism and how the United 
Nations Security Council respond to it focussing on North, West and East 
Africa.  
Results should not just address the challenges of the current environment, 
but should be able to stand the test of time and ensure that these horrific 
activities do not re-occur. 
In order to reach this stage, it is critical that all role-players, stakeholders and 
organisations work together to ensure that the crisis is addressed in the most 
effective way, but also, critically, managed under the umbrella of an 
organisation that has the capability, resources, capacity and leadership to 
intervene in these situations successfully. The United Nations Security 
Council is the one organisation that can fulfil this role. 
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Glossary 
 
Caliphate: A caliphate is an Islamic state. It's led by a caliph, who is a 
political and religious leader who is a successor (caliph) to the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad. His power and authority is absolute (Chandler, 2014:1).   
Epiphenomena: A secondary phenomenon that occurs alongside or in 
parallel to a primary phenomenon but has no causal influence on the primary 
phenomenon itself (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary).  
Neo-patrimonialism: A system of social hierarchy where patrons use state 
resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population. It 
is an informal patron-client relationship that can reach from very high up 
state structures down to individuals in small villages 
(https://en.wikipedia.org).  
Exogenous: An exogenous factor is any material that is present and active 
in an individual organism or living cell but that originated outside that 
organism, as opposed to an endogenous factor (www.thefreedictionary.com).  
Hawala: A method of transferring money without any actual movement. One 
definition from Interpol is that Hawala is "money transfer without money 
movement." Transactions between Hawala brokers are done without 
promissory notes because the system is heavily based on trust. A hawala 
involves a network of people in different locations (www.investopedia.com).  
Spaza shops: An informal convenience shop business in South Africa, usually 
run from home. They also serve the purpose of supplementing the owner’s 
household income by, selling every day small household items 
(www.wikipedia.org). These are shops that form part of the informal economy 
in South Africa whereby mainly foreign nationals (Somalians, Nigerians, 
Pakistani’s and Bangladeshis) buy or rent property in the mainly informal 
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settlements in South Arica and then set up informal shops in these 
communities. They create a very competitive market by charging very low 
prices for their merchandise, basically forcing legal, and tax paying South 
African shops out of the local market and business.   
Informal Economy: Refers to activities and income that are partially or fully 
outside government regulation, taxation, and observation. The main 
attraction of the undeclared economy is financial (www.worldbank.org).  
OECD Countries: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is a unique forum where the governments of 34 
democracies with market economies work with each other, as well as with 
more than 70 non-member economies to promote economic growth, prosperity, 
and sustainable development (http://usoecd.usmission.gov).  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background  
 
This report will present a number of interlinking scenarios pertaining to 
terrorism and the financing thereof, taking into consideration the different 
approaches to terrorism on the African continent and the fact that the current 
role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is not sufficient and 
effective in the fight against terror.  
The framework that will be presented is that of regime change theory and the 
link between terrorism and international trade, in an attempt to decipher the 
sources and mechanism behind the financing of terrorism.  
As the global village opened itself up to more robust international and 
transnational trade and interaction, it has become easier for terrorists to shift 
funds around and finance their activities through legal and illegal 
international trade. 
The UNSC initiated a number of resolutions in response to the financing of 
terrorism and how to combat it. The significance of these resolutions is to 
provide guidance and a legal framework for states to implement regulations 
and laws that will allow them to fight the financing and support of terrorist 
groups on a regional and domestic level. It also provides an opportunity for 
regional organisations to include these objectives in their missions.  
This report will thus focus on the role of the UNSC in combating the financing 
of terrorism on the African continent and how the lack of appropriate counter 
measures enhances the financing of terrorist activities, with clear evidence 
that there is an increase of terrorist activities on the continent. 
Regime theory and that of international law brings to the fore the question of 
whether terrorism should be treated as an attempt to change regimes or as 
cross border transnational crime. This report will suggest that the UNSC may 
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have to rethink approaches to terrorist groups and fight terror as a criminal 
act instead. The reasons provided for a change in the approach to terrorism 
and the different terror groups operating in North, West and East Africa is 
that these groups have different ideologies and motives behind their reasons 
for declaring war. 
Literature suggests there is very little co-ordinated efforts in fighting terror 
on the African continent. It further shows that the financing of these terror 
activities are well resourced and the question is: where does the financing 
originate from for operations, weapons, attacks and recruitment?  
This research will focus on the role of the UNSC in combating the financing 
of terrorism on the African continent. The study will emphasise the different 
terrorist groups prominent on the continent, namely ISIS in North Africa, 
Boko Haram in West Africa and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and how 
these groups finance their activities. Literature will further illustrate that 
there is a clear link between trade integration and transnational terrorism. 
Additional to that, there will also be an assessment on the current counter 
measures on the financing of terrorism on the African continent. There will be 
a specific focus on the activities and collaboration of the UN and the AU. 
Finally, this report will attempt to establish a link between crime and 
terrorism with an objective to highlight that the current counter measures are 
not effective and that the UNSC is the ultimate organisation to implement 
renewed measures on the African continent to not just deal with terrorism, 
but also with the source of the financing thereof. 
 
1.1 Research problem 
According to the Global Terrorism Index for 2015, there is an increase in 
terrorist activities globally. In spite of a number of anti-terrorism initiatives, 
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the phenomenon is ongoing and the question that remains is: How are these 
activities financed? 
1.2 Purpose of the research 
The purpose of the research is to ascertain how terrorist groups finance their 
activities in North, West and East Africa and whether the role of the UNSC 
is sufficient in combating the financing of terrorism on the African continent.  
 
1.3 Research question 
What is the role of the UNSC in combating the financing of terrorism in North, 
West and East Africa? 
 
1.4 Literature review 
The literature review will present the argument that there is a need for this 
research in order to assess the role of the UNSC in fighting the financing of 
terrorism on the African continent. Added to this, it will be attempt to prove 
that there is an increase in terrorist activities on the African continent and 
that this warrants an intensification of the response of the UNSC to this 
phenomenon. The UNSC should be involved in an effective terrorism-
combating method because the phenomenon of terrorism not just affects 
human rights on the continent, but poses a risk to the continent at large, 
influencing development, security, political stability and regimes. 
Defining terrorism remains a challenge. According to Lodge (1981:1), 
numerous attempts were made to define terrorism and to distinguish it from 
other forms of political violence associated with the conduct of a legitimate 
campaign against a repressive regime, which is normally despotic, military, 
fascist or a reaction to revolutionary violence, all of which have always been 
viewed in a legitimate frame. Recent attempts to construct typologies of 
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terrorism tend to categorise it as a sub-species of revolutionary violence 
seeking a change in regime or people in pursuit of political ends of 
revolutionary or anarchist form.  
Intrilligator defines terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use 
violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or 
social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of 
the immediate victims. Terrorism is also regarded as a global phenomenon” 
(Richardson, Gordon and Moore, 2009:14). Gendron (2012:403) defines 
terrorism not as an ideology, but as a set of criminal tactics which deny 
fundamental principles of democratic societies.  
The terror-crime interconnection is of such a nature that it is sometimes 
difficult to determine the difference between criminality and acts of terrorism 
or extremism. The line between criminals, terrorists and insurgents is often 
blurred, but whatever the motivation, the threat to public safety and security 
is multiplied to the extent that these networks co-operate or develop a 
symbiotic relationship with each other. This is the foundation which the 
terror-crime interaction is based on (Gendron, 2012:405). 
Goredema and Botha (2004:55) highlight that it is easier to define the act of 
terror than to label a group or organisation as a terrorist group or movement. 
The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) 
may also be used as a frame of reference in an attempt to define terrorism. In 
the Algiers Convention, terrorism is defined as:  
a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and 
which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause 
serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons 
or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural 
resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or 
intended to: 
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i. Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, 
body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to 
do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a 
particular standpoint, or to act accordingly to certain principles; 
or 
ii. Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service 
to 
iii. Create general insurrection in a State 
b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, 
incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or 
procurement of any person, with the intend to commit any act referred 
to in paragraph a) (i) to (iii). 
Article 3 of the Convention states that, notwithstanding the provision of 
article 1, the struggle waged by people in accordance with the principles of 
international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed 
struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by 
foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.  
This article is almost a contradiction of the aforementioned definition. It goes 
further by saying in point ii) that political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be justifiable defences against a 
terrorist act. 
It is quite evident that this provision protects the historical context of 
liberation movements on the African continent whereby many liberation 
movements, such as the African National Congress (ANC) were labelled as 
terrorist groups, understanding that this labelling was not necessarily based 
on the political ideologies of the ANC, but mainly on the activities that was 
associated with the group in the name of “the liberation struggle”.  
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The impact of transnational terrorism on trade integration cannot be 
examined without looking into the measuring of transnational terrorism and 
stylised facts. This cannot be done without considering the definition of 
terrorism and transnational terrorism. The Oxford Dictionary simply refers 
to terrorism as “furthering one’s views through acts of coercive intimidation”. 
The US State Department, for analytical purposes, defines terrorism as the 
involvement of premeditated and politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) 
define terrorism as the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extreme violence 
to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large 
audience (Mirza and Verdier, 2006:6). Transnational terrorism applies to 
terrorist acts involving citizens or the territory of more than one country, 
either as victims or perpetrators. 
As much as there is agreement about the difficulty to define terrorism, 
Goredema and Botha (2004:56) differentiate between international, 
transnational and domestic terrorism. International terrorism comprises of 
acts of terrorism that have international consequences; incidents where 
terrorist cross national borders to strike at a foreign target, select victims or 
targets due to their connection to a foreign country, e.g. 9/11 and ISIS 
targeting UN aid workers. Transnational terrorism occurs when an act of 
terrorism extends beyond the borders of one country, in terms of either 
victims, targets and/suspects, e.g. the attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya. 
Lastly, Domestic terrorism occurs when the act of terrorism is confined within 
national borders and does not include targets or agents from abroad, e.g. Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. 
Additional to that, for non-elected groups to resort to violence for the 
realisation of political ends in liberal democracies is regarded as illegitimate 
and unjustifiable, especially when it is accompanied by violence and force 
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where the means does not justify the end. This then borders on or constitutes 
a criminal act rather than political offence and should be treated as such 
(Lodge, 1981:1). 
Due to the fact that the characteristics of terrorism changed significantly over 
the last century, the difficulty in defining the occurrence is the fact that 
terrorism is not seen as an ideology anymore, but rather the insurrectional 
strategy of people of very different political convictions. It is not merely a 
technique, its philosophy surpasses the traditional dividing lines between 
political doctrines (Lodge, 1981:1). 
Jenkins argues that the threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or the 
campaign of violence is primarily designed to instil fear; to terrorise (Lodge, 
1981:2). Terrorism is violence for effect; not only, and sometimes not at all, for 
the effect on the actual victims of the terrorist. In fact, the victim may be 
totally unrelated to the terrorist cause. Terrorism is violence aimed at people 
watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the by-product of terrorism. This 
definition manifests in the operations and modus operandi of ISIS. 
This resonates with the techniques of Boko Haram in the West of Africa, 
whose technique is a strategic intent to destroy the confidence of a particular 
government by causing it to act outside the law, to bring about moral 
alienation of the masses from the government until its isolation has become 
total and irreversible, making life unbearable for a democratic government as 
long as terrorist demands remain unsatisfied (Wolf in Lodge, 1981:2). Hence 
the change of government in Nigeria was not a surprise as one of the main 
factors, objectives and results was the masses losing confidence in the 
previous government to respond to Boko Haram and the cruelty it displayed. 
In an attempt to conceptualise terrorism, the literature differentiates between 
three broad types of terrorism namely ‘revolutionary’ terrorism, aimed at 
political revolution; ‘sub-revolutionary’ terrorism, having political motives 
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other than revolution; and, lastly, ‘repressive’ terrorism, where the aim is to 
restrain certain groups, individuals or forms of behaviour deemed to be 
undesirable (Wilkinson in Lodge, 1981:3).  
‘Revolutionary’ terror activities are associated with organisational terror 
where the aim is to maintain internal order and discipline, making 
penetration from external actors virtually impossible. Members who err are 
also dealt with very harshly. The second aspect, ‘allegiance terror’ is less 
restrained, but involves the use of violence to create mass support in the form 
of funds obtained through extortion, strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience 
with the threat of vengeance. Thirdly, the actions taken to gain strategic 
advantage or the isolation of a category of victims by virtue of their function 
as targets of assassination can be described as ‘functional terrorism’. Fourth, 
‘provocative terror’ is a strategy, rather than terror, where the aim is to exploit 
the deed and escalate its impact. Fifth, ‘manipulative terror’ is characterised 
as the creation of a bargaining situation where threats are made to destroy 
assets or kill hostages unless certain demands are met. Lastly, the victims are 
selected based on the fact that they ‘represents’ the epitome of the enemy and 
this is referred to as ‘symbolic terror’ (Bell in Lodge, 1981:4). 
Further to the above, Bell (in Lodge, 1981:4-5) identifies ‘psychotic’ terrorism, 
which involves bizarre, ostensibly political actions with uncertain or irrational 
outward motivations committed for personal, internal reasons, whilst 
kidnappings and hijackings are labelled as pure criminal terror.  
Bell also identifies terror committed by governmental authorities, also called 
state terror or state violence. This form of terror he refers to as ‘endemic 
terror’, where the collapse of the state is the underlining factor. This is evident 
in the state of Somalia where state power is used for coercive purposes and 
vigilante terrorism arises where the volunteers, instead of the regime, is 
under threat from within with the purpose to curb or eliminate opposition (in 
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Lodge, 1981:5). Indigenous terrorism transcends national boundaries in its 
exercise, effects, ramification and prosecution. This is evident in the attacks 
that took place in Kenya by Al-Shabaab.  
For the purpose of this study, the following definition will be used by 
Dictionary.com which describes terrorism as acts of violence committed by 
groups that view themselves as victimised by some notable historical wrong. 
Although these groups have no formal connection with governments, they 
usually have the financial and moral backing of sympathetic governments. 
Typically, they stage unexpected attacks on civilian targets, including 
embassies and airliners, tourist destinations and, lately, hotels, with the aim 
of sowing fear and confusion. 
The anti-terror crusade has been extended to all corners of the world and 
Africa was not spared. Troops and spies are deployed in many African 
countries, suspected to be havens for terrorist activities, which include, 
amongst others, Nigeria in the West, Kenya and Somalia in the East and the 
ever troublesome North (Chweya, 2004:44).      
Literature shows evidence that Transnational Organised Crimes are 
inherently part of international crime and security threats. Depicted as a 
recent threat, it is also identified as a crime that is extremely flexible and 
capable of adapting and changing itself very quickly to new environments. 
This is the exact reason why it is found to be in such an alliance with terrorism 
(Carrapiço, 2012:19). This is also said to be the result of the latest political, 
economic, legal, technological and social changes in the world – the sudden 
increase in trade, globalised markets, the fall of the Soviet Union, the spread 
of corruption, the creation of the Single Market, the acceleration of economic 
transition, increased mobility, illegal migration and new forms of 
communication are some of the root causes for Transnational Organised 
Crimes in an increasingly smaller Global Village.  
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In recent years, other activities like human trafficking, immigrant smuggling, 
cybercrime and terrorism are some of the activities added to Transnational 
Organised Crimes. This is no longer just an economic problem, but has the 
capacity to destabilise countries where they operate economically, socially and 
politically. Because of the level of power reserved for state actors, this 
occurrence is currently referred to as a “threat” to the safety and security of 
citizens and to the existence of countries themselves, thus a security rather 
than a criminal problem. 
When looking at transnational crimes and terrorism, globalisation is the one 
concept that cannot be ignored. The free movement of money, people, goods 
and information are harnessed by terrorist and organised criminals. This 
results in money being raised in one country, used for training in another 
country, for procurement of goods in another country and eventually for 
terrorist activities in a final country. The opportunities that have come with 
globalisation have changed both the nature of transnational organised 
criminal groups and terrorist networks and the connection between them. 
Developments in the financial, banking, travel and communications sector 
have enabled terrorists to extend their reach by becoming more networked 
and integrated, while taking advantage of weak and failing states to establish 
sanctuaries and strongholds. This development was also documented by the 
UN (UNICRI, 2007:104). 
Terrorist groups have also moved from hierarchical bureaucracies to flatter, 
more decentralised networks. The trend has been for a shift from well-
organised, localised terrorist groups supported by the state, to loosely 
organised, international networks which are dependent on their own 
worldwide fundraising efforts and donations. In these loosely organised 
groups, operatives are part of a network of cells that rely less on direction and 
more on shared values and horizontal co-ordination to accomplish goals. 
Terrorist networks now engage in large-scale criminal activities to fund their 
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core activities and like criminal syndicates, have shown that they too are 
prepared to form alliances to accomplish their objectives (Gendron, 2012:404). 
The terrorist attack in November 2015 on the Radisson Blu hotel in Mali is 
reported to be the first collaborated attack between ISIS and Boko Haram. 
An overview of literature of these highly volatile areas indicates that there 
are commonalities in these regions pertaining to the existence of terror and 
the mistakes made in combating terror. Clan, religious and cultural divisions 
remain at the centre of this phenomenon. These armed conflicts represent the 
“third wave” of hostilities, which is violence through small arms and light 
weapons (SALW), which have been a major determinant in the cyclical 
violence in Somalia. This also links to the argument by Omitola (2014) that 
terrorism and crimes have blended to define the characteristics of the Fulani 
herdsmen attacks on farmers in Nigeria, fuelled by the deployment of 
trafficked small arms and light weapons from the Sahel region (Mwanika 
2010:65-66). 
The events of 11th September 2001 undoubtedly took terrorism to another 
global level, whereas previously it was an uncomfortable aid to anarchism, 
liberation wars and counter-insurgency campaigns. At one level regarded as 
an unlawful, threatened use of violence against individuals and property, 
accompanied by intimidation of governments or societies for political 
objectives, terrorism is now distinguished from common crimes and other 
offences because the motivation is not only for financial gain (Cilliers, 2003). 
The main ingredient of terror is now understood to be retaliation.  
With the US State Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, it clearly 
indicates that international terrorism is on the increase in Africa. This is 
further supported by the Global Terrorism Barometer, 2015. Since the early 
1990s, a new threat emanated from loose groupings of individuals with similar 
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backgrounds and beliefs, who respond to terror as a way of striking against 
their enemies. 
Cilliers (2003:194) states that early effective countermeasures from North 
Africa managed to halt the spread of radical terror further afield. 
Globalisation remains an important factor in the spread of international 
terrorism, e.g. internet, cell phones and social media are used by terror groups 
in recruitment, organising attacks and spreading fear in a particular country 
or region, as seen with ISIS. Even though Algeria represents the country in 
Africa mostly entangled in international terrorism, complex characteristics 
drive much larger menace, such as domestic terror. 
The opportunities that Africa presents to international terrorist groups (see 
Figure 1: Terrorism in North Africa & Sahel in 2012: Global Research and 
implications in Appendix page 121) to hit the international community are 
limitless, e.g. peacekeepers, aid workers, donor agencies and multinational 
offices are easy target. This is evident in the realities of shootings, 
assassinations, kidnappings or hijackings, which are popular modus operandi 
for terror in Africa (Cilliers, 2003). These are the same networks that support 
armed trafficking, money laundering and illegal human trafficking for the 
various proxy wars fought in Africa, blurred in neo-patrimonialism, which is 
a system of social hierarchy where patrons use state resources in order to 
secure the loyalty of clients in the general population. It is an informal patron-
client relationship that can reach from very high up in state structures down 
to individuals in small villages. The link between international terrorism and 
transnational crimes is very close, as highlighted in the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1317 (article 4), focusing on the global security problem that this 
phenomenon poses. 
Botha and Solomon (2005) highlight that terrorism, and in particular Islamic 
extremism, presents a real threat to regional and international security on 
the African continent. The biggest threat presents itself in the formation of 
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terror networks that have disastrous consequences, as witnessed in the terror 
activities in the Eastern Horn of Africa. These acts lead to the differentiation 
between victims and agents of terror, which in Africa is a growing 
transnational threat to international security. They further claim that the 
reason behind these claims are the arguments that Africa is the breeding 
ground for transnational terror activities, the lack of interest, political will 
and a definite commitment from the developed world and some African 
governments to pro-actively counter this threat (Botha and Solomons, 2005:1). 
Some of the most prominent characteristics of the presence of terrorist activity 
in North Africa are the desperate socio-economic conditions and the military 
dominated governments that prevail in most of these countries, which is used 
by military and government leaders as an excuse for repressive measures to 
consolidate their hold and power. This provides the ideal conditions for 
natural discontentment and the growth of militant sentiments (Botha and 
Solomon, 2005:6). Even though each of the North African states manifests a 
different Islamic militancy and politic, their governments react in different 
ways to the realities of the political challenges. The perception, nature and 
extent of these militancies by their states, contributes to the indiscriminate 
and spiralling acts of violence and the way they formulate their internal and 
foreign policies on how to deal with this threat. 
There are three main groups that are recently highly active and generate 
terror in the North, West and East of Africa, namely the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) in the North, Boko Haram in the West and Al-Shabaab in the 
East. ISIS has received broad attention from the media. This group follows in 
the footsteps of Al Qaeda and most Arab states, under the influence of the 
United States (US) developed strategies and responses that centre around 
military interventions by implementing air strikes on camps and 
infrastructure of this group. ISIS is mainly referred to as the “new” Al Qaeda, 
with membership from Western citizens. These individuals who have joined 
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the ranks of the organisation are often arrested either en route to join the 
ranks or on their way back from their countries of citizenship (Blumenau, 
2014:1). 
 
1.4.1 What makes ISIS dangerous 
Blumenau (2014) defines terror as the all-encompassing strategy (and thus 
not an ideology) that aims at instilling fear through violence or the threat 
thereof in order to further a political (or religious) agenda. This definition 
differentiates a terror group from a guerrilla movement or liberation group, 
who normally want to control a certain territory, use heavier weaponry, often 
operate in bigger fighting units, in some cases wear uniform, use small 
handguns and explosives and want to implement specific political or religious 
goals. In spite of these clear characteristics, ISIS displays features of both, 
which makes this group different. 
The Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq, 
published a horrific video showing the beheading of U.S. journalist James 
Foley, calling it a “Message to America.” The 50,000-strong Islamic militant 
group threatened to do the same to another American journalist in Syria, 
identified as Steven Sotloff, if the Obama administration did not meet its 
demands. He was beheaded on video as the “Second Message to America”.  
The goal of the extremist group was to use shocking images to intimidate the 
Obama administration into halting US strikes on ISIS strongholds in Iraq and 
Libya. These airstrikes seemed to be impeding ISIS’ ultimate objective: to 
maintain and expand its self-declared caliphate. The extremists have already 
seized large parts of Iraq and Syria, taking control of several of the towns’ 
main resources, like wheat and oil fields. They had previously seized the 
largest dam in Iraq, and Foley’s beheading came just a day after U.S. and 
Iraqi forces successfully regained control of the Mosul dam (Masi, 2014). 
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After the initial airstrikes were announced, the Islamic State vowed 
retaliation for the airstrikes, calling for sleeper-cell attacks on U.S. interests 
worldwide through its social media accounts. Part of creating the caliphate, 
for ISIS, means eradicating everyone who does not adhere to their rule of 
“convert or die.” In Syria, ISIS has made huge gains in eradicating those they 
call "infidels". Since the strikes and beheadings, ISIS managed to secure the 
towns of Turkman Bareh, Akhtarin, Dabiq, al Masoudia and al Ghouz in 
Northern Syria, close to Aleppo. So far ISIS has seized territory in Iraq and 
Syria that is about the size of Belgium and their plans to expand the caliphate 
does not end there. One of the group’s former names was the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant, which includes Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and 
Israel. In June 2015, a pro-ISIS rally was held in the Jordanian city of Ma’an. 
In early August, media outlets all over the world published a map purportedly 
showing how ISIS wanted to conquer parts of Europe in the next five years. 
The map was later debunked (Hofmeister, 2015: 80). 
In terms of territorial expansion, it remains to be seen whether ISIS is a group 
just devoted to the regional goals of establishing an Islamic caliphate, or if at 
the same time they are developing global and transnational capabilities in 
order to attack the West. 
ISIS was established in 2003 and was known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. With 
attacks in Iraq, in recent years, the organisation continues its assaults on US 
army installations, Iraqi authorities, the population and, most recently, 
targeted and assassinated Western citizens. During 2005 it surfaced that 
there are links between the group and Al Qaeda, which resulted into them 
being classified as a terrorist group by the US and other governments. Two 
years ago the group started participating in the Syrian civil war, expanding 
its territorial presence. It officially changed its name to Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria in 2013 and started to move beyond the association with Al Qaeda, 
by developing a distinct character of its own (Blumenau, 2014). 
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ISIS’ aspirations are more clearly defined due to origins in the idealised notion 
of the Caliphate. The original Caliphate was established in 632 in the Arabian 
Peninsula. The title was given to the first leader, after the death of Prophet 
Mohammad. The word “Caliph” means successor. By using this word, ISIS is 
attempting to establish itself as the leader of the Muslim movement and 
mobilise a broad coalition of support by eliminating national boundaries. This 
group also developed a hierarchical structure and draws from committees for 
financing, law, security and other themes to manage its organisation and 
territory, thus featuring characteristics of a guerrilla group or even a 
liberation movement. Unlike most terror groups, this group strives for 
territorial control and wants to create its own state. The group also displays 
separatist characteristics, but not based on a single ethnic group that is trying 
to fill the vacuum left by Al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. ISIS directs its violence 
intentionally against non-armed targets (Blumenau, 2014). 
ISIS has special characteristics which makes them more dangerous. These 
characteristics will now be explored. First, it recruits members that possess 
European and Western passports, thus making it difficult for the authorities 
to control these, mainly youth, as they return home to carry out attacks as a 
means of retaliation, e.g. the first reports of ISIS sympathisers who planned 
to behead random victims in Australia is but one of these trends. In order for 
this group to retain its credibility, they need to resort to terrorist tactics, with 
a clear intention: spread fear in Western societies about the ISIS revenge and 
to build up enough domestic pressure to force governments to cease their 
operations against the ISIS in the Middle East (Blumenau, 2014:4). 
Secondly, for as long as the struggle in Syria and Iraq continues, ISIS will 
remain a potential threat with plans and possible committed attacks in 
Europe and the North America. ISIS thrives on the level of political instability 
in the region and will continue as long as anarchy is present in these 
countries. In case a political solution can be found, the group will splinter into 
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smaller groups and will focus on domestic security instability (Blumenau, 
2014). 
A new regional concept of peace, stability and perspectives to pacify the region 
by including all ethnic and religious groups might result in weakened support 
for ISIS. This will require a serious commitment from the international 
community and might come at a price (Blumenau, 2014:5).    
The fact that ISIS combines the features of both a guerrilla group and a 
religious terrorist group allows for it to be referred to as a hybrid organisation. 
This is both an advantage and disadvantage to the group, in the sense that it 
increases the claim to legitimacy as it struggles for a just cause. On the other 
hand it enlarges its recruitment pool. It will be difficult for the group to exist 
beyond the current situation in the North, once a long-lasting solution is found 
for the problems in the region (Blumenau, 2014:5). 
In conclusion, under the above conditions, the end of conflict in the region will 
not necessarily translate into the end of ISIS terror. This group will have to 
form a critical role in the process of stabilising the region otherwise the 
current military approach might not be the solution. 
 
1.4.2 The rise of Boko Haram 
Boko Haram has created an ungovernable space in North-Eastern Nigeria and 
on the Cameroon border, with the potential to resurrect regional Islamic rule 
in West Africa (see Figure 2: Challenges to US Diplomacy: Dealing with Terrorism 
and Instability in the Horn of Africa-Strategic Thinking on East Africa in Appendix 
page 121). Driven by hostility towards secular authority and compelled by 
ethno-religious hatred, they successfully inspired hatred and fear in the 
region. Governments on both sides of Nigeria and Cameroon seem not to be 
able to deal with the situation or stop the groups from spreading terror in the 
region. This group managed to wage terror rapidly and made impressive 
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territorial gains across Nigeria and have sharply and rapidly increased 
violence (Celso, 2015:1). 
Boko Haram is characterised by cultish practices and millenarian ideological 
association with smaller groups and organisations. The notion that terrorism 
is rational does not fit the theological driven terror organisations. Analysing 
Boko Haram as a traditional Islamist group is highly misplaced in dealing 
with this group, mainly because this group is very capable of short-term 
operational rationalities due to the fact that their long-term objectives are 
utopian and farfetched (Celso, 2015:1).  
Defined as a 5th wave Jihadist group, Boko Haram’s main characteristics are 
the rejection of the existing social-political order, idealisation of a mythic past, 
the quest for millenarian justice, youth culture, brutalisation of women and 
children, kidnappings, ethnic and sectarian cleansing, unrestrained violence, 
charismatic leadership, support for Sharia Law and the development of a new 
society (Celso, 2015:6). Boko Haram ultimately seek to destroy Western 
culture and political institutions in Nigeria and Iraq and they believe these 
Western institutions are sinful and corrupt (Celso, 2015:8). 
Boko Haram originated in the 1970s from the Maitatsine Movement and 
started with moderate demands on the government. As the movement grew, 
their demands and agenda became more radical and trans-Islamic. By 1980 a 
populist insurgency was created that attacked police stations and the 
government. The Nigerian army intervened, the group was ordered to disband 
and the followers of Muhammad Marwa revolted. This resulted in over 4000 
people dying and hundreds of villages destroyed.  
Recent literature on terrorism in Nigeria did not just link Boko Haram with 
terrorist organisations in the Sahel, but also establish that they are linked to 
organised crime networks in Nigeria and West Africa. This is specifically 
important as the relation between Boko Haram elements and the existence of 
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the Fulani herdsman in Nigeria are defined mainly in terms of culture and 
religion, which is also shared in neighbouring countries. Therefore, the crimes 
and terrorism have mingled to define the character of the Fulani herdsmen 
attacking farmers in Nigeria. These attacks are further fuelled by violence 
through the deployment of trafficking of small arms, drugs and light weapons 
from the Sahel region (see Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix). This results in a 
direct link between the attacks of the Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram 
(Bolaji, 2014). 
There is a continuous failure of the Nigerian authorities to deal with these 
attacks and the challenge may be weak domestic security apparatus and the 
lack of non- co-operation with other states within the framework of ECOWAS 
(The Economic Community of West African States) to tackle terrorism and 
trans border crime (Bolaji, 2014).    
Despite these impressive gains, the odds are against Boko Haram and it is 
most likely to repeat the pattern of popular revulsion, internal rebel 
dissension and external resistance, which will ultimately lead to their 
implosion. 
 
1.4.3 Why do people join terrorist groups? The case of Al-Shabaab 
In keeping with its name, Al-Shabaab, which means “The Youth”, targets 
young adults and adolescents, who are especially vulnerable to recruitment. 
This is an important time in a person’s life trying to establish the political 
“self” and also form worldwide opinions and beliefs. Young people are also 
more idealistic and reform minded, because of the lack of political and socio-
economic participation, they are easily drawn into unconventional methods 
and political behaviour, by clearly defying the older generation in their 
political manipulation (Botha and Abdile, 2014). 
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The main catalyst for terror activities in Somalia and the involvement of Al-
Shabaab in this region is the socio-economic conditions, lack of education, 
unemployment and political circumstances in a region that is characterised 
as a failed state with little or no societal order. The collective identity and 
sense of belonging contributes to the radicalisation of almost complete 
societies in the region of East Africa, of which the major contributing factors 
are the economic conditions and the killing of Muslims in Iraq and Palestine 
(Botha and Abdile, 2014).  
One factor that separates Al-Shabaab from the other terrorist groups is the 
fact that it is highly invested in intelligence-gathering capabilities. Secondly, 
they use coercion, intimidation, bribery and outright murder to collect 
information, which results into many people co-operating out of the fear of 
being killed. Their targets are well identified and range from Somali 
government officials, parliamentarians, UN staff members, donor community, 
local and international organisations, local staff working for these 
organisations and their families, including business people and all ties with 
these entities, e.g. Kenyans play an important and critical role in the 
intelligence operations conducted by this group. Additional to this, clan and 
family networks are being used to recruit informers. Basic and 
unsophisticated techniques to track, monitor and target individuals makes it 
difficult for the advanced techniques of the international community to trace 
the activities of this group (Botha and Abdile, 2014). 
In order to destabilise this group, a fair number of partnerships need to be 
established with clan leaders and community leaders to kick-start a nation-
building process that will not be associated with Al-Shabaab. Education and 
employment security will be the only option for individuals to provide for 
themselves and their families. An effective government will have to be 
established to ensure that societal order is created and to provide essential 
services. The Somalian security forces have to embark on stringent counter-
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terrorism techniques and operations to counter insurgency programs which 
will also hamper the organisation from infiltrating government. The building 
of trust will be critical to establish a sense of pride and loyalty to the 
government. Better co-ordination and co-operation between security agencies, 
transforming authority from military to police is essential, and lastly, 
establishing rule of law and a society based on human rights that uses force 
minimally (Botha and Abdile, 2014). 
The drivers of territorial control however seem to differ in both the cases of 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. The need to establish and maintain a trade 
infrastructure (including imports and exports) appears to be more important 
to Al-Shabaab than to Boko Haram, which did not make serious attempts to 
govern its areas of control. Al-Shabaab, by contrast, views itself as a 
government, reflecting its roots in Somali nationalism, including the popular 
Somali dream of a “Greater Somalia”. Such beliefs, coupled with the 
traditional Somali acumen for commerce, continue to drive Al-Shabaab’s 
strategy even as it loses territory. Indeed, its focus shifted from controlling 
ports to controlling lucrative routes between these ports and the Somali 
hinterland. It also diversified its sources of revenue through the imposition of 
various taxation schemes and tighter control over lucrative money exchange 
businesses in Somalia and the Somali diaspora. 
The dynamics within this group makes it quite a challenge to study and 
research, because it is continuously on the move and reinvents itself based on 
the many global channels that exist. This makes the counter measures 
implemented by the UN and AU even more impractical as resolutions and 
policies do not adapt to the changing techniques of the terrorist group.  
Based on literature, it is quite evident that the different terrorist groups 
assessed during this research have different motivations behind their 
existence, and their composition and structures differ significantly. One 
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approach or methodology in combating the financing of terrorism will, 
therefore, not be effective.  
 
1.5 The financing of terrorist activities 
The Economist of August 2005 starkly reminded us of the revolutionary 
anarchism of the late 21st century, where terrorism has been a fact of life in 
human security (2006:2). The events of 9/11, Madrid and London brought 
renewed attention to the phenomenon of transnational terrorism in modern 
society, emphasised by the latest events in France, Mali and Tunis. 
Mirza and Verdier (2006) offer a general analytical framework to illustrate 
the complex two-way interactions between trade and transnational terrorism. 
Empirical studies point to the appropriate controlling of these interactions in 
terms of distinguishing between “source” countries and “target” countries of 
terrorism and taking into account the inter-temporal persistence of terrorism 
between specific pairs of countries.   
The impact of the terrorist attack on the tourism venue in Tunis highlighted 
the viability of an open global economy. Economic globalisation was thought 
to have contributed to an increased vulnerability of nations to transnational 
terrorism, while international economic transactions are significantly affected 
by terrorist incidents and counter terrorist policies. Worldwide international 
trade increased drastically in the last three decades, with trade volumes as a 
percentage of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing from 27% to 45% 
by year 2000 (Mirza and Verdier, 2006). This resulted into Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) exploding over the same period. The increasing number of 
trucks and container vessels that facilitate international commerce certainly 
enhanced the likelihood of a terrorist successfully smuggling themself or a 
weapon undetected across a vulnerable border. Added to that, the growing 
number of international financial transactions made it increasingly difficult 
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for international monitoring and interception of money used to support and 
finance terrorist activities. This evolution might have facilitated the 
development and capacity of terrorist groups to execute acts of terrorism 
successfully in foreign countries. 
Concurrently, terrorism and the associated anti-terrorist policies taken by 
governments have an impact on the costs of doing international business. 
Terrorism directly generates anxiety and risk resulting in people being more 
careful about the potential harm embedded in any transaction, which affects 
the uncertainty on economic returns and transactions that creates a reduction 
or shift in investment and demand patterns with non-negligible implication 
for trade transactions. Counter-terrorist policies tend to multiply the negative 
impact of terrorism on trading costs. Costly inspections and monitoring and 
tight security at airports and seaports increase the cost of travel for both 
tourists and business people and the cost associated with shipping goods, 
especially when time is factored as a cost. This is enough reason to question 
the perceived increased prevalence of transnational terrorism in relation to 
the process of globalisation experienced in the last three decades (Mirza and 
Verdier, 2006). 
The questions that remains are: what are the links between globalisation and 
transnational terrorism, what are the effects of terrorism on international 
trade integration and, lastly, does the open global village contribute to 
transnational terrorism? 
Literature shows there is a significant link between transactional cost effect 
on trade and terrorism by reduced willingness to get into business with agents 
from an “unsecure” country (country of location, origin or target). Terrorism 
also impacts on trade indirectly due to the effect on counter-terrorism policies 
that are implemented in response to terrorism attacks. Terrorist acts also 
indirectly affect trade through their impact on real GDP. Simultaneously, 
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terrorist acts or security measures against those acts are not exogenous, but 
are the outcome of strategic interaction between terrorist organisations and 
the authorities at the borders (Mirza and Verdier, 2006:3). 
The appropriate controlling of the different interactions which prevail 
between terrorism, security measures and trade, distinguish between source 
countries and target countries of terrorism, taking into account the inter-
temporal persistence of terrorism between specific pairs of countries (Mirza 
and Verdier, 2006:3). Thus, international integration and transnational 
terrorism encompasses openness to transnational terrorism and trade flows, 
openness to transnational terrorism and counterterrorist policies and 
international integration (Mirza and Verdier, 2006). 
Whichever definition is being used to define terrorism, three characteristics 
remain central and essential to all of them: terrorist acts are premeditated 
and politically motivated, aim to intimidate an audience larger than the 
immediate victims and, lastly, are undertaken by groups which have no 
sovereign national recognition.  
Another challenge with terrorism is the fact that there is also no unified 
system where reporting of incidents takes place. Most of the recorded 
incidents are reliant on media reports and this is influenced by authoritarian 
countries where the freedom of information is limited. In the case of 
transnational terrorism, these reporting biases are less severe as information 
may stem from diverse sources. One of such sources is ITERATE. This 
database compiles publicly available media sources on the country of location 
of each incident, the number and nationality of the victims, the nationality of 
the terrorist organisation and the type of incident (Mirza and Verdier, 
2006:10). 
Based on this information, the following assumptions can be made: there is no 
significant increase in incidents, but there is an increase in the number of 
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victims and casualties since the 1990s; terrorist activities seem to be cyclical; 
attacks towards the US or US interest constitutes a substantial portion of the 
total events; and, transnational terrorism is a local phenomenon, meaning 
terrorists hit targets that are relatively close to home and/or have big 
influence on internal policies of the origin countries. This is evident with the 
attacks of Al-Shabaab in Kenya (Mirza and Verdier, 2006:12). 
Terrorism is not a new problem (Passas in Lum and Kennedy, 2012:255). 
Factors that enhance the problem of terrorism include globalisation and the 
cross-border movement of ideas, information, people, goods and capital that 
resulted into terrorism being brought to the fore. Terrorist fundraising has 
been traced back to almost every legitimate and criminal source imaginable, 
especially when there was no difference between terrorism, insurgency, 
guerrilla warfare, civil war or independent and liberation movements. History 
shows that militant groups and organisations are likely to turn to any means 
available for the raising and transfer of funds in support of their operations 
and activities. This statement is supported by an interview with Person A who 
said that where there is a will there is a way, where it was highlighted that 
terrorists will use any means to achieve their goals and objectives. The 
growing infrastructure of anti-money laundering and counter financing of 
terrorism, highlighted the importance of untangling the numerous groups 
involved in terrorist activities and focusing on those representing the highest 
threat to security and economic interest worldwide (Passas, 2012:255). 
The main objectives of countering the financing of terrorism is to monitor 
illicit and militant activities in order to prevent terrorist actions, to reduce the 
harm of terror attacks and to facilitate the investigative work seeking to 
identify co-conspirators and facilitators. Neither the utility nor the need for 
controls against terrorism finance are questioned, but it should be matched 
with other counter-terrorism measures, on the basis of evidence and analysis, 
fairly and in compliance with more general national and international legal 
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standards, especially those in support of universal human rights (Passas, 
2012:256). 
Passas (2012:257) identifies a number of developments in social controls that 
have significantly progressed since the 1980s in respect of serious crimes, 
mainly cross-border of nature. The two main processes are identified as the 
“follow the money” approach, targeting profitable underlying offences, and 
secondly, the shift of control functions and responsibility to the private sector, 
especially where financial institutions have been burdened with the task of 
due diligence and reporting knowledge of their clients, record keeping and 
filing of reports of suspicious activities and transactions to the authorities. 
The first reference to financial controls against terrorism can be found in 
Europe, when a 1980 Council of Europe Recommendation reflects the official 
concern about operations mounted by the Red Army Faction and Red Brigades 
by citing “acts of criminal violence such as holdups and kidnappings” (Passas 
in Lum and Kennedy, 2012: 258). The basis of the current framework for 
countering terrorist finance was laid by the UN initiatives and Resolutions 
1267 (1990), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 
1735 (2006), 1822 (2008) and 1963 (2010). These resolutions vary from the 
prevention and suppression to the criminalisation of the financing of terrorist 
acts. It also puts a responsibility on member states to freeze funds, 
emphasises the ratification of International Conventions, and the 
classification of the financing of terrorist activities as an independent offence 
(Passas, 2012:259). Unfortunately, all these legal frameworks caters for 
international action and does little to ensure the implementation of these 
conventions down to the domestic level, where it can actually make a 
difference.  
The magnitude of state conflict on the African continent is evident in the last 
decade where the attempt to deal with armed conflict on the continent has 
38 
 
made up about two-thirds of the United Nations Security Council’s activities 
and has involved nearly three quarters of its active peacekeepers (Williams, 
2006:309). Since the inception of the UNSC, conflict on the African continent 
has been overwhelmingly instra-state, identified as the “new war” (Kaldor, 
2001:6).  
The current research will focus on mainly two aspects of this new war, namely 
the financing of terrorist activities and physical combat practices. 
Freeman and Ruehsen (2013:5) identify six main methods that are widely 
used to finance terror activities, namely cash couriers, informal transfer 
systems, money service businesses, formal banking and false trade invoicing 
of high value commodities. These processes are attributed by volumes, risk, 
convenience, simplicity, costs and speed. Other methods include stolen value 
cards, prepaid debit cards, casinos, digital currency, e.g. Bitcoin, mobile 
payments and the selling of phone cards.  
ISIS also uses pre-existing government structures by using former 
government employees of the Saddam Hussein regime. Oil has also become 
the backbone of ISIS funding as many opposition forces depend on ISIS for 
diesel. Crude oil is sold directly to independent traders. Other sources of 
income are extortion and taxes from any person who crosses its territory (see 
Figure 5: Global Terrorist Hotspots Mapped (2014) and Figure 6: Islamist Militants 
Groups and their areas of influence in Africa in Appendix page 123) and 
expropriating real estate from those who have fled the region. Food crops are 
also a source of terrorist financing, with ISIS controlling over 40%of Iraq’s 
wheat cultivating land. With ISIS gaining control over one of the richest 
archaeological sites in the world, antiques and artifacts has become an 
important source of income (see Figure 6: Islamist Militants Groups and their 
areas of influence in Africa in Appendix page 123). Human trafficking, 
kidnapping and smuggling remain one of the top activities to finance terrorist 
39 
 
activities with human rights abuses as an instrument of terror and a source 
of revenue. The Kidnap for Ransom (KFR) is a specialised unit within ISIS. 
There is a lack of expertise in the field of ITC and media is mainly used to 
broadcast terror activities and to prevent journalists from entering into their 
territory. There has not been any report of any cyber-attacks conducted by 
ISIS. ISIS mainly uses online media tools to disseminate its vision of the 
caliphate, thus creating an international brand and image, a modern day 
vanguard of militant Islam, the only legitimate jihadist movement to hold 
territory and govern a pseudo state. Whilst social media is mainly used for 
recruitment (Liang, 2015:78).   
It is evident from this analysis that terrorists use multiple methods to move 
money around. Even though there are a number of counter-measures in place, 
Africa remains vulnerable to these techniques due to a lack of formal banking 
system for the tracking and tracing of funds and the implementation of 
financial intelligence services and units are still a very foreign strategy on the 
continent. Even if these counter measures exist, African countries lack the 
facilities to ensure compliance and regulatory frameworks to enforce 
legislation pertaining to these activities.  
ISIS’ diverse financial portfolio makes it the richest terrorist organisation in 
history, with an estimated wealth of US$ 2 billion. The reason why they are 
so effective is because they run its criminal or terrorist enterprise with a 
business acumen that has no historical precedent. This enterprise is also 
based on a list of “lessons learned” from its predecessor, The Islamic State of 
Iraq, whereby it identified the failures of Al-Qaida in utilising its financial 
resources effectively, e.g. the failure to distribute funds to local cells and the 
inability to acquire a regular funding source. This was enough motivation for 
ISIS to redesign a modern business strategy to run its enterprise, which 
include a corporate plan, structures, source coding, recruitment plan, 
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identification of sources of income and how to target influential families and 
military opponents (Liang, 2015:77).  
In support of this, Boulden (2003:2) indicates that the focus on Africa is 
important because Africa is the region where the UNSC have a larger 
presence in terms of conflict resolution. Added to that, historically co-
operative efforts between regional organisations and the UN have been mostly 
tested. The UNSC can also draw most of its experiences and lessons learned 
from their experience in Africa. It is evident in the African Agenda for Peace 
by UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, together with 
ECOWAS that Liberia and Sierra Leone remain the most significant African 
case studies of substantial relevance to the conflict resolution comparative 
assessments where lessons can be drawn on how to address different types of 
conflict successfully. 
Boulden (2003:3) further states that the UN’s experience in Africa had an 
enduring and significant impact on the way in which the UN responded to 
conflict during the post-Cold War period. The cases that can be referred to in 
support of this statement are the UN withdrawal from Somalia and the failure 
of the UN to respond timeously to the genocide in Rwanda. This resulted in a 
significant effort to rethink the way in which the UN dealt with international 
peace and security. This further resulted in member states’ hesitancy to get 
involved in complex conflicts. The impact and lessons learned from Rwanda 
and Somalia resulted into member states reconsidering their level of 
involvement in terms of the level of resources committed to and the UNSC 
and decisions made without its approval or mandates.  
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism of 1999 from the AU was introduced after the Algiers Convention 
and it forms an essential part of the international strategy to counter 
terrorism. The aim of this convention is to prevent and counteract the 
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financing of terrorist activities, focusing on groups that claims charitable, 
social or cultural goals as a front for the financing of terrorist groups 
and/operations; and implementing measures that will make provision for the 
identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities. 
This includes bank secrecy (Goredema and Botha, 2004: 99). Measures to 
suppress the financing of terrorism on the African continent includes: 
a) Legislative measures such as legal instruments in preventing 
and prosecuting individuals who finance acts of terrorism 
b) Instruments to alert authorities to suspicious transactions 
c) Legislation to detect, identify and freeze funds 
d) The regulation of public collection of funds 
The AU Plan of Action, which was adopted after 9/11, intended to implement 
the Algiers Convention. Specific obligation, in line with the international 
requirements, provided a well-structured framework to analyse the 
introduction of and implementation of measures to suppress terrorist 
financing on the part of member states. Algeria was one of the first countries 
to criminalise the financing of terrorism by adopting Ordinance 95.11 of 25 
February 1994, which allows for a five- to 10-year imprisonment if found 
guilty for the financing of terrorism.  
In December 2002, Nigeria passed three laws to support the crackdown of 
money laundering and tightening of regulations in the banking sector. South 
Africa implemented the POCA (Prevention of Organised Crime Act) of 1998, 
whereby money laundering and criminal gang activities were criminalised. 
This law also allows for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. The FICA 
Act (The Financial Intelligence Centre Act) of 2001, 1-70 also specifically 
focuses on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations. 
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In 2001, Uganda issued the Anti-Money Laundering policy document designed 
to strengthen the fight against money laundering and circulated it to 
stakeholders for implementation. This policy document was followed by the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 14/2002 (Goredema and Botha, 2004:102) 
On the other hand, Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal does not have any specific 
legislation to prohibit individuals or entities from making funds available in 
support of terrorist acts. There are also no mechanisms to collect, collate and 
analyse financial intelligence. Kenya also has no law to regulate the 
movement of funds across the borders. The country did implement two 
circulars, one focusing on suspicious transactions and the other on details 
required for the opening and operating of a bank account (Goredema and 
Botha, 2004:104). 
The implementation of the UN Convention of the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism, article 4(1) of the Prevention of the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Bill extends beyond the 
provision of financial or monetary assistance to include the use of property 
and other economic support as instruments of means to finance acts of 
terrorism (Goredema and Botha, 2004:102). 
The events of 9/11 and the effort that was made after that to combat terrorism 
and its activities in comparison to pre- 9/11 efforts, shows that the 
international community applied limited attention to the issue pre 9/11. 
Research indicates that long before 9/11 the UN implemented a number of 
conventions, which was only implemented by a few states. In Africa, the 
Kenyan and Tanzanian bombings of 1998 influenced the drafting of the OAU 
anti-terrorism convention. As much as 9/11 was a watershed manifestation of 
terrorist activities, it was also a decisive moment for counter-terrorism 
initiatives. However, a number of gaps exists between theoretical 
requirements and practical considerations, especially pertaining to border 
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control and instruments to prevent the financing of terrorist activities. 
Resources and training remains a major challenge. Constant re-assessment is 
required for the medium- to long-term strategies to prevent the recruitment, 
movement and support of terrorist groups (Goredema and Botha, 2004:120). 
The ratification and implementation of regional and international 
instruments should be regarded as an ongoing priority, which presents a 
direct and indirect threat to international, regional and human security, 
international and regional bodies with the assistance of the civil society, who 
also have a responsibility to prevent draconian counter-terrorism policies and 
legislation from provoking and legitimising terrorism. Excessive counter-
terrorism legislation and initiatives in itself directly threatens democracy. 
Governments should not just gather information in the name of counter-
terrorism operations only, but should also protect the political order of the 
day. Africa often acts against terrorism as a national security risk at the cost 
of the rule of law that exists in many of the states. There is a need to ensure 
that liberty, the rule of law and the principles of fundamental justice will be 
protected in societies (Goredema and Botha, 2004:121).  
The ultimate question that remains is how effective the approaches to the 
countering of the financing of terrorist activities was this far? To what extent 
has it been fairly implemented?  
Research shows that, not only are many measures ineffective, but they also 
have counterproductive consequences by generating incentives for financial or 
other flows to shift to channels less regulated or monitored, e.g. informal value 
transfer systems. There is also a need for a systematic assessment of threats 
and vulnerabilities in different economic sectors, because different groups will 
raise and transfer funds in very unalike ways, providing a typology of terrorist 
finance. Diamond trade has also become a very attractive way to ‘transfer’ 
funds across borders. An increased phenomenon is that of tobacco and the four 
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major forms of illicit cigarettes, ranging from trade diversion, invoice 
manipulation, smuggling and counterfeiting of tobacco products, and although 
all four occurrences happen on their own, they often coincide with each other 
and other illegal activities, particularly in the light of cross-border trade and 
the promotion of governments to increase international and regional trade 
(Passes, 2012:273). 
There are further allegations that ISIS generates in the region of $ 1 billion 
from heroin trafficking between Afghanistan and Europe. Additional to that, 
The United States accused the government of Qatar of funding the terrorist 
group, even though they acknowledge that they do not have evidence to base 
these allegations on, they believe private individuals are supporting the 
financing of the activities of this group. They further believe that the Gulf 
States are aware of it and are not doing enough to stop it. Over the past two 
years, ISIS have accepted donations as much as $ 40 million from the 
government or private sources in the oil-rich nations. These donations are 
alleged to be laundered through unregistered charities in the form of 
‘humanitarian aid’ with members of ISIS co-ordinating geographical drop-off 
points for payments using cell phone applications such as WhatsApp and Kik. 
These two applications can be used worldwide and in the case of Kik, you don’t 
even need a phone number to register (Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 
2014:2).  
Not only can WhatsApp be used around the world but, crucially, it 
incorporates a GPS mapping tool that makes it easier for terrorists to 
communicate their exact locations to each other. Affiliated ISIS Twitter 
accounts openly publish their Kik usernames. 
The biggest financial coup that ISIS achieved thus far was the looting of the 
Central Bank in Mosul. This activity resulted in funds approximated at $ 429 
million in cash. This was apart from the other bank in Mosul regularly 
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plundered by ISIS. Willem Marx from Bloomberg highlights that The Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Shams (ISIS) has become the richest terror group ever 
after this event. Additional to this, they export approximately 9000 barrels of 
oil per day at price ranging from $25 to $45. It is further reported that the 
majority of these funds are transferred through the US. Iraq still blames 
Saudi Arabia for the financial wellbeing of this group and fear that ISIS will 
probably use some of the money to buy military equipment. During its 
conquest of Mosul, the ISIS fighters bagged a lot of US weapons and vehicles. 
Their current financial power allows them to easily buy additional high-
quality weapons on international armaments markets.  
Amidst all these allegations, Charles Lister from the Doha Centre in Qatar, a 
subsidiary of Brookings Institute, highlights that there is no publicly 
accessible proof that any state or government is involved in the sponsoring or 
financing of the terrorist activities of ISIS. On the other hand, Günter Meyer 
from the Centre for Research into the Arabic World at the University of Mainz 
posits a wide variety of financial possibilities for ISIS and disagrees with 
Lister and agrees with the US that ISIS gets its funding from the Gulf States, 
primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuweit and the United Arab Emirates. The 
motivation for the Gulf States to financially support ISIS is to support their 
fight against the regime of President Bashar al Assad in Syria (Money Jihad, 
2014).  
The oil rich region also provide a key financial source to ISIS. These oil fields 
are controlled by ISIS and it is alleged that trucks transport the oil across the 
border into Turkey. This, added to the transnational crime theory also 
provides an explanation why there has been an increase in attacks in Istanbul.  
Lister disagrees with him in that he believes ISIS is largely able to fund itself. 
This is due to the networks established by this group within societies that 
generate a continuous flow of money. This argument is based on the 
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systematic extortion conducted by ISIS affecting small businesses and big 
companies, construction firms and in some cases even local government 
representatives. The organisation also levies taxes in the areas that they 
control.  
Meyer disagrees with him in that he believes that there is no possibility that 
money can flow to ISIS from Sunni circles connected to Iraq, before the fall of 
Saddam Hussein. He believes that the goals of ISIS are way too different from 
those who used to be in Hussein’s network. Both groups want to topple the 
Shiite government of Iraq, but ISIS wants to establish an Islamic theocracy, 
whereas the Sunnis from Hussein's Baath Party want to establish a secular 
democracy (Foundation for Defence of Democracies, 2016). 
Meeting in Turkey just two days after the horrific November 2015 terrorist 
attacks in Paris, leaders of the G-20 countries issued a statement condemning 
recent ISIS attacks and reaffirmed their commitment to combat terrorism. 
More specifically, the group of industrial nations recommitted itself to 
"tackling the financing channels of terrorism." Which begs the question: How 
does ISIS finance its international operations?  
ISIS is primarily financed through a wide array of criminal activities, large 
and small, centred in the parts of Syria and Iraq under their control. It is 
alleged that ISIS steals livestock, sells foreign fighter passports, taxes 
minorities and farmers and truckers, runs a sophisticated extortion racket, 
kidnaps civilians for ransom payments and loots antiquities. It also makes 
about $ 40 million a month from illicit oil sales alone. But these sources 
primarily support the group's expensive state-building and war-fighting 
enterprises back home, ranging from paying teachers’ salaries and collecting 
the garbage to bribing tribal leaders and paying fighters' salaries (Levitt, 
2015). 
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There is, however, an entrepreneurial self-financing model that ISIS 
implements that supporters around the world have been encouraged to use to 
fund either their travel to ISIS-controlled land or, perhaps, their attacks. 
While it is too soon to state with any certainty how the Paris attacks were 
funded, the likelihood is that they were funded in whole or in part through 
local criminal activities or legal activities such as the use of state welfare 
benefits or taking out a loan. None of these would surprise, since authorities 
have been tracking the use of such funding schemes by prospective foreign 
terrorist fighters looking to join ISIS. Indeed, earlier this year, a FATF report 
identified several potential revenue streams for would-be foreign terrorist 
fighters, including robbery and drug trafficking, various social service 
payments and unpaid loans. Some potential plotters or travellers took on 
short-term jobs to raise the money they needed, while others simply drew on 
their savings or student loan accounts (FATF Report, 2015). 
Consider a few examples. Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who murdered a Canadian 
soldier before attacking the Canadian Parliament buildings in October 2014, 
worked at one of the Alberta oil fields to raise money for his attempted travel 
to Syria. Petty crime has the potential to bring in sufficient funds for a home-
grown attack or transportation to a combat zone as well. There is the case of 
the 15-year-old boy in Montreal who held up a convenience store with a knife, 
stealing some $ 2,200 to pay for his plane ticket out of Canada. The teen's 
father turned him in to the police after finding the money in his son's bag. Or 
take the four men arrested in February in Brooklyn, N.Y. for attempting to 
join ISIS. Some of their funds were supplied by a supporter who operated mall 
kiosks selling kitchenware and cell phones. According to the indictment, a 
round-trip ticket to Istanbul costs a mere $ 598. One of the defendants 
expected that "he would not need to bring more than $ 400 to travel to Syria 
because he would not have any concerns in the land of the Islamic State." In 
Britain, the Metropolitan Police's counterterrorism command unit has noted 
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several cases where jihadists financed themselves through state-funded 
welfare payments. Most recently, Yahya Rashid used his student loans and 
educational grants to cover the travel costs for himself and four friends to go 
join ISIS in Syria via Morocco and Turkey. Christopher Cornell, who stands 
accused of plotting to detonate pipe bombs at the U.S. Capitol and shooting 
people as they ran away, simply "saved money" to conduct his attack, 
according to the FBI. In several cases, including the shooting in Canada, 
individuals whose travel to Syria was thwarted turned to deadly attacks at 
home instead, easily redirecting transportation funds toward home-grown 
acts of terrorism (Levitt, 2015).  
Whilst ISIS' governance and military expenses in Syria and Iraq are high, 
carrying out an attack in the West is inexpensive. For example, in the January 
2015 attacks in Paris against Charlie Hebdo magazine, a police officer and a 
kosher grocery, Amedy Coulibaly claimed to have helped the Kouachi brothers 
with their "project" by giving them "a few thousand euro" so they could buy 
what they needed to buy. The two Kouachi brothers reportedly received $ 
20,000 from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but the rocket-
propelled grenade launcher and the Kalashnikov automatic assault rifles used 
by the Kouachis cost less than $ 6,000. Coulibaly himself reportedly used a 
false income statement to take out a 6,000 euro loan to finance the purchase 
of weapons for the attacks. And while AQAP claimed responsibility for the 
Kouachis' attack, Coulibaly self-identified with ISIS (Levitt, 2015).   
Another possible funding stream available to terrorist operatives is old-school: 
the abuse of charities. In light of the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Syria 
and Iraq, the FATF warned earlier this year that "the possibility of abusing 
charities by ISIS or its affiliates directly or indirectly for fundraising or 
funding activities needs to be recognized." Over the past year, European 
countries have taken action against several charities over terror finance 
suspicions. In November 2015, French authorities shut down Pearl of Hope, a 
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charity that claimed to "promote the health and education of sick Syrian and 
Palestinian toddlers," arresting two people on charges of financing terrorism. 
According to investigators, while Pearl of Hope did deliver food and medical 
supplies, "the group was also using such deliveries as a front to funnel covert 
funds to jihadist groups and had links to the Nusra Front." About a dozen 
other charities were under surveillance at the same time, some on suspicion 
of ties to ISIS. To date, these cases involved raising funds for terrorist 
activities in Syria and Iraq, but the potential for skimming small amounts of 
money off the top for terrorist travel or operations has authorities concerned 
(Levitt, 2015). 
There is one other way attacks like those in Paris may have been financed, in 
whole or in part: with funds from ISIS itself. Unlike previous attacks, which 
were almost all lone-offender plots inspired by ISIS, the Paris attacks were 
foreign-directed operations planned outside France as part of what CIA 
director John Brennan recently described as ISIS' "external operations 
agenda." This agenda is reportedly led by senior ISIS official Abu Muhammad 
al-Adnani, whose recorded messages calling for attacks in the West appear to 
correlate to the increased operational activities of ISIS operatives in Europe. 
Late last year, as European foreign terrorist fighters affiliated with ISIS 
began trickling back home to Europe – some, it is now believed, to carry out 
attacks – al-Adnani issued this directive to ISIS followers: "If you can kill a 
disbelieving American or European, especially the spiteful and filthy French, 
then rely on Allah and kill him in any manner or way however it may be." 
According to former French counterterrorism judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the purported ringleader of the Paris attacks and 
several earlier plots, would almost certainly have been in contact with senior 
ISIS officials about plots like these. 
In the event that ISIS leaders wanted to send funds from their war chest to 
finance operations abroad, there are several ways they could do so even as 
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ISIS has been largely cut off from the formal financial system. The Central 
Bank of Iraq, for example, has instructed financial institutions to prevent wire 
transfers to and from banks located in ISIS-held areas, and international 
banks with regional branches in these areas have relocated their staff. But 
there are other ways ISIS could send funds if it chose to do so, beyond having 
returning foreign terrorist fighters carry small sums of money back to Europe 
on their person. 
First, despite the Iraqi government's efforts, officials remain concerned that 
the Assad regime in Syria has not placed any restrictions on the banks in ISIS-
held areas. And even in Iraq, the FATF warns, some bank branches in ISIS 
areas "may maintain links to the international financial system." Although 
many international institutions likely cut ties to these banks, FATF found 
that the latter are still able to liaise with certain, unnamed jurisdictions 
(FATF Report, 2015). 
ISIS has also engaged in backdoor banking, accessing banks with ties to the 
international financial system just outside the areas it controls. Dutch 
officials report that foreign terrorist fighters who arrived in Syria or Iraq were 
using their European debit cards linked to their national bank accounts when 
withdrawing money from ATMs in areas near where ISIS operates (Levitt, 
2013). 
Beyond the formal banking system, ISIS can also send and receive funds 
through nearby foreign money remitters. Finnish authorities report that a 
common method of getting funds to foreign fighters once they arrive in Syria 
or Iraq is to send it via "money remitters who have agents operating in border 
areas close to ISIS-held territory" (FATF). Dutch authorities have noted 
similar activity and "regard it highly likely that intermediaries transport cash 
to areas near territory occupied by ISIS" (FATF). ISIS operatives have come 
up with other schemes as well. For example, Saudi authorities reported to 
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FATF that individuals associated with the group solicited donors via Twitter 
and told them to establish contact via Skype. The operatives then asked these 
donors to purchase international prepaid cards (e.g., mobile phone credit or 
store credit) and send them the card numbers via Skype. The information 
would eventually reach a follower near ISIS-held territory in Syria, who could 
then sell it and take the resulting cash to the group. While these cases all 
involve the movement of funds to Syria and Iraq, they could be used just as 
easily to send funds in the opposite direction (FATF Report, 2015). 
Whether the Paris attackers financed their operations through criminal or 
other activities in Europe, or whether they were funded in whole or in part by 
ISIS funding from leaders in Syria and Iraq, the fact remains the attacks were 
certainly inexpensive. Following the money trail after the fact can be an 
extremely effective investigative and intelligence tool to map out covert 
networks, identify other operatives and prevent follow-up attacks, but the 
financial intelligence tool is no panacea. At the end of the day, such small 
sums of money are easy to come by and can facilitate painfully successful 
attacks (Levitt, 2013). 
Despite the poverty of Northern Nigeria – where 70% of people live on less 
than a dollar per day – the Boko Haram terrorist group has at its disposal a 
seemingly limitless amount of heavy weaponry, vehicles, bombs and 
ammunition that it uses to kill with unfathomable wantonness. The Islamic 
militancy, masquerading as members of the military, raided three villages in 
North-Eastern Nigeria and mowed down 400 villagers “from house to house” 
using “sophisticated weapons,” one local leader told Bloomberg (McCoy, 2014). 
How is Boko Haram paying for all this? Who would finance this campaign of 
slaughter? 
According to a survey (Survey: Perception of Boko Haram among Nigerians, 
July 2013) conducted by Peregrino Brimah and  Rotimi Adigun of Research 
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Guilt, academic, governmental and journalistic accounts, Boko Haram funds 
its escalating acts of terror through a diverse network of black market 
dealings, local and international benefactors, and links to Al-Qaeda and other 
well-funded groups in the Middle East. Analysts say its fundraising apparatus 
is intricate and opaque. “The actual source of the funding,” wrote Heather 
Murdock in Voice of America, “is as elusive as the militants themselves.” 
(http://rguild.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Perception-of-Boko-Haram-
among-Nigerians.pdf). 
The story of Boko Haram’s fundraising begins after the terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. In 2002, the group’s original 
leader, a charismatic cleric named Mohammed Yusuf, who was later killed, 
founded the group as an alternative to Western education (see Figure 7: Growth 
of Terror: Since its formation as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2-13, it has 
conquered regions of Iraq, Syria and recently Libya in Appendix page 124), which 
he claimed undermined Nigeria’s development. It is alleged that around that 
time, Osama bin Laden sent an aide to Nigeria with $ 3 million in local 
currency to dispense among groups that shared Al-Qaeda’s mission to impose 
Islamic rule. One of the “major beneficiaries,” reported by the International 
Crisis Group, was Boko Haram. 
But even such alleged financial connections with Al-Qaeda does not explain 
Boko Haram’s money. Like a river sucking water from many tributaries, Boko 
Haram draws funding from other sources as well. The group reportedly also 
gets cash from Islamic terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and 
local Al-Qaeda affiliates. 
“Each of those three organizations is by itself a dangerous and worrisome 
threat,” Carter Ham, head of the U.S. military’s Africa Command, said in 
2012. “What really concerns me is the indications that the three organizations 
are seeking to co-ordinate and synchronize their efforts – in other words, to 
establish a co-operative effort amongst the three most violent organisations 
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… And I think that’s a real problem for us and for African security in general” 
(McCoy, 2014). The co-ordinated attack on the Radisson Blu in Mali is known 
as the first co-ordinated and planned attack between all three of these groups. 
In addition to that, there is black market money. Beyond a hatred of Western 
education, economic motives may have also driven Boko Haram’s abduction of 
the schoolgirls (see Figure 8: Islamist factions active in Africa in Appendix page 
124). A robust and terrifying slave market hums in Nigeria and neighbouring 
countries. “Kidnapping has become one of the primary funding sources, a way 
to extract concessions from the Nigerian state and other governments, and a 
threat to foreigners and Nigerian government officials,” according to West 
Point’s Combating Terrorism Centre. It is worth “millions of dollars in ransom 
money.” Boko Haram was paid $ 3 million when it freed a French family last 
year. After that, it released an Italian priest and a Canadian nun “as part of 
a prisoner exchange with a fee being paid,” an anonymous source told Agence 
France-Presse. (Canada disputed that allegation). According to Terrorism 
Research & Analysis Consortium, bank robberies also account for $ 6 million 
of the group’s wealth. 
Experts agree that one of the best ways to stall Boko Haram is to cut off its 
funding. But how to do that isn’t clear. The group is an entrenched part of life 
in Northern Nigeria, possessing control and influence (see Figure 9 : ISIS main 
source of income in Appendix page 125), and even collecting taxes.  
A complex finance network that includes everything from fake charities to 
kidnapping has supported the East African militant group Al-Shabaab's 
activities over the past few years. It’s difficult to know specifics but experts 
say these sources of capital have been essential to Al-Shabaab’s growth, and 
will be much harder to wipe out. Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab is 
battling the U.N.-backed government in Somalia and is suspected of having 
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links to a string of attacks in neighbouring Kenya, e.g. the Westgate shopping 
centre that killed 68 people. 
While the group has been around for nearly a decade, things began to change 
in 2012. They were forced out of many major cities and a vital port, which 
meant Al-Shabaab had to start looking elsewhere for financial support. 
Members once had control of the vital port city of Kismayo, where they 
profited from millions of dollars’ worth of charcoal exports. But in 2012, 
Kenyan forces ejected them, dealing a major blow to their finances. “That 
entire area provided so much money to Al-Shabaab, and when that was taken 
away from them they absolutely had to diversify to find other ways of 
receiving funds,” Roger Carstens, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Research 
Group's Program on National Security, said in The Somaliland Times. The 
steady stream of income helped kept the group organised and under control. 
But as international attention and pressure from local military forces 
increased, the group has become less co-ordinated. Like other regional 
militant groups, members are known for charging protection fees and "taxes" 
on local businesses and NGOs operating in the area. Somalia’s telecom sector 
has been unregulated for decades, which means the prices are low and 
opportunities are big for entrepreneurs. But as Money Jihad reports, this 
means elders and local businessmen are negotiating with huge operators like 
Arabsat. Gulf news also reported that many middlemen overcharge so they 
can pay off Al-Shabaab members. The New York Times reported last year that 
Al-Shabaab has a team of “white-collar militants” who use elaborate taxation 
schemes to extract money from farms and businesses. But even without local 
money, Al-Shabaab has been supported from the outside for some time. 
There are reports that the Eritrean government was sending money and 
resources, which forced the U.N. to impose sanctions in 2009, citing concerns 
that “Eritrea has provided support to armed groups undermining peace and 
reconciliation in Somalia.” In 2012, the U.S. also sanctioned a handful of 
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military officers that supposedly worked closely with Al-Shabaab in the past. 
But beyond the state sponsors, the militant group has other ways of getting 
money from abroad. “The two major things would be Al-Qaeda- affiliated 
groups and sympathizers within the diaspora,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, 
senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told International 
Business Times.  
Banking records show that members of the Somali diaspora have been 
sending money home from various locations around the world -- including the 
United States. For example, in 2011 two Minnesota women received prison 
sentences for soliciting donations in Somali neighbourhoods around the U.S. 
and Canada “under the false pretence that the funds were for the poor and 
needy,” according to the federal indictment.  
Loads of attention has also been drawn to poaching in recent months. Rhino 
horn and ivory are valuable commodities that have not escaped the attention 
of groups like Al-Shabaab, which reportedly facilitates trade to buyers in the 
Middle East or China. “The organization has the financial means to sustain 
an Improvised Explosive Device terror campaign in large part because of ivory 
wealth,” wrote Jeremiah Foxwell, a global security researcher at John 
Hopkins University, World Policy Journal.  
They are also reported to deal in commodities. Kenyans consume 800,000 tons 
of sugar every year, according to the Kenya Sugar Board, but only produce 
500,000 tons domestically. Consequently, more than $ 1.2 billion of Somalia-
produced sugar is imported into Kenya every year, though much of it is not 
declared, and has been a sweet opportunity for Al-Shabaab. In 2012, the U.N. 
reported that 10,000 bags of contraband sugar were sold every day at lower 
prices. For example, a regular bag costs roughly $ 58 while a smuggled bag 
costs $ 53. The benefit of trading actual commodities is the lack of a report 
trail. And it’s easier to transport sugar secretly than it is vast amounts of 
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money through wire transfers. Weapons can also be easily concealed in these 
bags. 
“Not only is trade diversion difficult to detect, it is also versatile and allows 
funds to remain in numerous countries without serious injury to the 
authorities,” wrote Donald de Kieffer, a former General Counsel to the U.S. 
Trade Representative. This method “has serious implications for terrorist 
financing in that it enables terrorist groups to successfully raise and hide 
funds while evading government scrutiny.” 
Underlying these and other transactions is the “Hawala,” a unique type of 
money transfer that requires no big banks and leaves no trace. The system, 
whose name translates roughly as a remittance, is a quick and cheap method 
to transfer money around the world. “The very features which make hawala 
attractive to legitimate customers – efficiency, anonymity, and lack of a report 
trail – also make the system attractive for the transfer of illicit funds,” reads 
a report from the U.S. Treasury Department (Gurule, 2008: 173).  A hawala 
involves a network of people in different locations. A customer pays one agent, 
who sends a message to another agent, who then pays the recipient the same 
amount. Often, transactions are done within a day, and records don’t show 
names or other specifics. The Kenyan Ministry of Finance suspects that more 
than $70 million is transferred this way, though there is no way to prove that. 
This simple solution is just one of many ways Al-Shabaab, like other terrorist 
groups, is trying to get around the authorities when it comes to money. 
The Journalist for Justice reported that Kenya’s survival is mainly dependent 
on the capacity of the country to stem the wave of insecurity that terrorist 
attacks associated with the Al-Shabaab group have wrought on the country. 
The human cost of these attacks are very high, especially with regards to 
economic disruption (Kegoro, 2015).  
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This report from the Journalist for Justice highlights the many challenges 
that counter-terrorist agencies and organisations face when it comes to the 
governance and effectiveness of the implementation of the counter-measures. 
The question that almost immediately arises is how one deals with the 
scenario where governments are seemingly involved in the support of systems 
and processes used by terrorist groups to the detriment of their own citizens. 
This emphasises the point made by the Mr Miles Armitage, Ambassador for 
Counter-Terrorism, Australia that in order to resolve violent extremism, a 
framework of inclusion and diversity is critical, supported by good governance 
(IIS Seminar, February 2016). 
 
1.6 Current initiatives on combating the financing of terrorism 
on the African Continent 
 
Although the UNSC is increasingly withdrawing from direct involvement in 
world conflicts, the organisation increased the involvement of regional bodies 
and organisations to resolve conflict within their own regions. The 
underpinning factors that persuaded the UNSC to pull out from conflict, not 
just worldwide, but also in Africa, were the high risk of financial, personnel 
and political losses. Two significant events triggered the UNSC to review their 
security approach and policy to Africa concerning conflict and conflict 
resolution: the scale of problems that the UNSC experienced in Somalia and 
Rwanda and the withdrawal from the post-Cold War enthusiasm to get 
involve in conflict. 
There are a number of reasons Africa is a hotbed for transnational terrorism. 
Firstly, the geographical and religious implications of the power relations 
between African States and transnational terrorism. Terrorism became a 
problem with incalculable dimensions for all people in the world with the 
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ineffectiveness of African states to respond to it when they come under attack 
(Mentan, 2004:2). 
Africa recorded 6,177 known casualties from 296 acts of terrorism between 
1990 and 2002, making it the continent with the second most casualties in the 
world, after Asia (Goredema and Botha, 2004:51).  These numbers only reflect 
the number of international terrorist attacks on African soil. In addition to 
these attacks, African countries have been plagued by periods of domestic 
terrorism, resulting in shocking effects on human life, stability and 
development. This compelled the AU to shift its focus to terrorism after 1982 
and propose a number of resolutions to be implemented by member states.  
Goredema and Botha (2004:52) warn that domestic terrorism should be taken 
as seriously as international terrorism and even though most affected African 
countries responses are based on international pressure and mandatory 
requirements from the UNSC Resolution 1373, the primary obligation of these 
states lies with their citizens. African countries that have been directly 
affected by the impact of terrorism, whether domestic or international, proved 
to be well equipped with mechanisms to deal with terrorism through 
specialised intelligence gathering and crime prevention measures, ensuring 
limited access by terrorist to these countries. African countries are at different 
stages of development and implementation of legislation aimed at the 
prevention and criminalisation of the financing of terrorism.  
The UNSC has passed four key resolutions on countering the financing of 
terrorism. At international level, UNSC Resolution 1373 calls on all UN 
members to criminalise the use or collection of funds intended for terrorism, 
in addition to freezing funds, denying support and denying safe havens for 
those who support, finance, plan or commit terrorist acts. In March 2015, the 
Countering ISIS Finance Group was established (Liang, 2015:79).   
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This proved to be less effective against domestic terrorist groups who do not 
require extensive financial resources to execute their activities, e.g. Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. National initiatives to counter the financing of terrorist 
activities also seem to be very new, making them difficult to assess, taking 
into account the lack of resources, training and experience (Goredema and 
Botha, 2004:53).  
There are a number of spikes in the wheel when it comes to combating 
terrorism and the financing of terrorism on the African continent. The need to 
act against terrorism as a national security risk, without destroying the 
domestic rule of law that exists in many constituent states is but one of them. 
These legal tools should not undermine the values within countries, 
threatening their solidarity and sovereignty. It is evident that in the cases 
where terrorist acts are characteristics of local conflicts, security measures 
alone do not end the violence. Some form of political accommodation and 
settlement will be required. The lack of a functioning, nationally-recognised 
central government and failed and weak African states provides a safe haven 
for domestic and international terrorists, as is the case in Somalia with Al-
Shabaab. The interview with Person B confirms this as they state that there 
can be no success combating the financing of terrorism without dealing with 
governance issues within states first, as good governance and institutions are 
a support structure to implement and maintain anti-terrorist initiatives.  
Military operations against terrorist groups alone have proven to be 
insufficient as they are not linked to or joined and in collaboration with a 
process aimed at reconciliation and the reconstruction of a functioning state 
with a government in control of its territory, urban and rural, its land, sea 
and aerial. There is also very limited research available with regards to the 
role of SSR (Security Sector Reform) in curbing the activities of terrorist 
groups within a country upon regime change. This was confirmed in the 
interview with Person G. In this interview it was confirmed that the strategies 
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and approaches of peacekeeping operations had to adapt in order to ensure 
the terrorist component of the operation in Somalia is addressed. This is 
simply because terrorist groups are not officially regarded as a formal security 
sector component. But maybe it is time that the possibility is considered in 
order to ensure that SSR does become all inclusive and makes provision for 
the involvement of liberation groups. An example is the involvement and 
absorption of the former ANC armed wing into the formation of the national 
security forces in South Africa when there was a transition in government and 
the adoption and implementation of democracy. 
The AU, through the Peace and Security Council, remains concerned about 
terrorism on the continent. Very significant measures include the 
implementation of the African arrest warrant, counter terrorism fund, the 
implementation of the AU counter-terrorism 2004 Protocol and the 2002 AU 
Action Plan. Strengthening the continental and regional framework is the 
establishment of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, 
the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa and numerous 
other protocols declarations.  Implementation of these protocols remain a 
challenge. 
Africa’s commitment to prevent and combat terrorism dates back to July 1992 
when the Head of States and governments of the OAU adopted a number of 
Declarations against Extremisms (Goredema and Botha, 2004:57-62), signed 
in Dakar. The aim of these declarations was to enhance co-operation and co-
ordination between African states against the manifestations of extremism on 
the continent. The 1994 Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations led to the 
OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which was 
adopted in Algiers in July 1999 and which together with the “Plan of Action” 
of the African High Level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism in Africa are the latest and most comprehensive 
instruments in Africa addressing terrorism. This includes four main 
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commitments, namely: to ratify international instruments and incorporate 
these into domestic legislation, establish and enhance inter-agency co-
operation at national level, strengthen surveillance and border control, and 
suppress the financing of terrorism. National anti-terrorism units can broadly 
be classified as structures responsible for facilitating co-operation in respect 
of analysing and preventing terrorism, and as anti-terrorist units responsible 
for intervention and protection (Interview with Person G). 
According to the Africa threat assessments conducted in eight countries in 
context of the response of these states to global counter-terrorism initiatives, 
these counties have committed themselves to the Algiers Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Evaluating the degree to which 
terrorism poses a threat to human security and how it varies considerably in 
these countries, Algeria, Kenya and Uganda remain in the high risk category 
with activities ranging from election violence, and transnational and domestic 
terrorism. Intermediate threats are posed in countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia 
and South Africa, where the surge of religious and ethnic conflict remain a 
challenge. Ghana and Senegal are categorised as low threat due to the fact 
that there are no direct experiences of terrorist threats or incidents 
(Goredema and Botha, 2004:64). 
The commander of AFRICOM, Army General David M. Roderigues, states 
that the threat of terror remains on the African continent with terrorist 
groups in the North and West Africa expanding their operations, increasingly 
threatening the US and its interests. Coupled with the fragility of 
neighbouring states, this continues to destabilise the affected regions. Despite 
programmes and exercises with Nigeria, Boko Haram is now operating in 
Niger, Chad and Cameroon. After an absence of over twenty years from 
Somalia, the US now have individuals on the ground to co-ordinate AU and 
UN operations to disrupt and contain Al-Shabaab forces and areas, to weaken 
the militant group (se Figure 10: Boko Haram fatal attacks in Appendix page 
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126). Africom is mainly using military-military engagements, programmes 
and exercises to respond to crises and threats in an attempt to guide African 
partners to combat these problems (Simeone, 2014). 
The endemic nature of ethnic conflict in Africa since the 1960s is a 
consequence the consequence of civil wars, but while the conflicts have 
evolved, the responses to these conflicts did not. Furthermore, the factors that 
support these conflicts are not being dealt with to the core (Mentan, 2004:20). 
Contrary to that, according to Murphy and Collins (2013), the challenges that 
face Africa today are very different from the one’s mentioned above. 
Contemporary threats are devastating agricultural and rural sectors, poorly 
maintained and destroyed infrastructure, over-inflated and worthless 
currencies, absence of well-integrated and viable economies, the lack of 
gainful participation in international trade and global affairs, uncontrollable 
rates of unemployment (especially amongst woman and youth), high rates of 
HIV/Aids which are decimating each country’s scarce labour resources, high 
levels of corruption and public malfeasance and a general absence of the rule 
of law (Mentan, 2004:20). 
The final reason for the terrorist focus on Africa is the fact that the UN’s 
efforts on the continent have generated mixed result pertaining to conflict 
resolution. As much as Africa has success stories to tell, failures and 
unfinished efforts outweigh the successes. The African continent struggles 
with long-standing, perverse conflicts that remain evidence of the inability of 
the UNSC and international and regional bodies to deal adequately with these 
challenges, for example Somalia (Boulden, 2003:3). 
Terrorism, not just the term, but also the appearance, has evolved over the 
years and the attacks on the US embassies and Paradise Hotel is evidence of 
how it manifests itself and how different trends have emerged when 
comparing the terrorism of today to the terrorism before these attacks. 
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Terrorism in the past was generally practised by a collection of individuals 
belonging to an identifiable organisation with clear command and control, 
with a set of political, social or economic objectives (Mentan, 2004:2). This has 
changed inherently. 
The terrorism threat that was previously confined to the North has now 
spread to the broader Northern and West regions (see Figures 11, 12 and 13). 
This happened despite the presence of the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA) and the French military under 
Operation Barkhane. Maïga (2015) highlights that the re-emergence of the 
Macina Liberation Front (MLF) can largely be attributed to a strategy from 
ISIS to redirect attention away from their activities in the North. The 
increased attacks and the emergence of new fronts to the centre and South of 
the Northern regions can mainly be assigned to reorganising or continuing 
their trafficking activities in the North (see Figure 11: Trans-Sahara trafficking 
and threat finance-22 April 2015 in Appendix page 126). This also confirms that 
there is an operational link-or at the very least an ideological link- between 
the groups in the North and those in the centre and South of the Northern 
regions.  
Added to that, Mali did not receive the same attention from its authorities 
with regards to the insecurities in the North. This encouraged the creation of 
several self-defence militia in the centre manifesting in the attack on the 
Radisson Blu hotel in November 2015. Confronted with growing terrorism 
threats, it is increasingly clear that the national authorities and their 
international partners must adapt their response. In spite of many 
amendments to its mandate, MINUSMA did not prioritise the fight against 
terrorism. Instead, this responsibility was delegated to French Operation 
Barkhane, which replaced Operation Serval in August 2014. This operation 
was significantly downgraded from 3,000 men to 500 deployed across five 
countries. This significantly impacted on the mission’s efficacy in dealing with 
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the terrorist threat in the entire territory, which is significance evidence that 
the UNSC’s response to terrorism on the African Continent is flawed. There 
are many other examples. 
The approach towards terrorism on the African continent needs to be 
redirected and this fast-spreading threat requires timely tactical mobility and 
intelligence. Collaboration with the local populations is also essential. This 
will eliminate and prevent the human rights abuses often associated with the 
fight against terrorism. The recent Mali attacks provide an opportunity for 
the UN and the Malian authorities for in-depth reflection and analysis of the 
factors behind the emergence and spread of terrorist attacks in areas where 
it did not previously happened (Maïga, 2015).  
On Tuesday, 9th February, the Security Council was briefed by Jeffrey 
Feltman, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on UN counter-
terrorism efforts against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). This 
briefing was followed by consultations. The briefing was based on the 
Secretary-General’s first report on the threat posed by ISIS to international 
peace and security and the range of UN efforts in support of member states in 
countering the threat, requested by resolution 2253 of 17 December 2015, 
which was released on 29 January 2016 (S/2016/92).  
Traditionally, reports on ISIS or other Al-Qaida affiliates have been developed 
by the Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIS (Dae’sh)/Al-Qaida 
Sanctions Committee. During the negotiations of Resolution 2253, several 
Council members expressed their concern that with a new reporting 
requirement, the Secretary-General was essentially being asked to report on 
the same issues as the Monitoring Team. Other members thought it was 
important for the Secretary-General to report on a serious threat such as ISIS. 
In the end, a compromise was found by requesting that the report place more 
emphasis on strategic thinking and less on implementation measures. 
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Updates on this strategic-level report are expected to be provided by the 
Secretary-General every four months, although it remains unclear how useful 
Council members will find this new reporting track on counter-terrorism. 
The briefing further focused on the analysis of the threat and strategic-level 
recommendations. The report acknowledged that ISIS represents an 
unprecedented threat to international peace and security that is able to adapt 
quickly to the changing environment in order to persuade or inspire like-
minded terrorist groups around the world to facilitate and commit acts of 
terrorism. In particular, the report highlighted the evolution of the threat in 
the last 18 months, including ISIS’ growing sphere of influence (see Figure 3: 
Militant Spheres of Influencein Appendix page 122), the increasing complexity 
of recent attacks (in terms of planning, co-ordination and sophistication), and 
the steady stream of foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIS and its affiliates.  
Despite Council action targeting foreign terrorist fighters, the report noted 
how figures have risen to an unprecedented level (around 30,000 originating 
from over 100 member states) as a result of the increasing number of ways 
potential recruits can access information on how to join ISIS, including 
through the internet. Equally, despite the Council’s renewed focus on the 
financing of ISIS, the report underlined ISIS’ rapid and effective mobilisation 
of financial resources in the service of recruitment and territorial expansion, 
characterising ISIS as “the world’s wealthiest terrorist organisation” 
(Hofmeister, 2015: 87).  
Council members may want more information about the recommendations on 
strengthening the capacities of member states in order to ensure the 
implementation of legal obligations already imposed by the Council regarding 
issues such as the financing of terrorism, the travel and recruitment of foreign 
terrorist fighters and others. The report’s only recommendations addressed 
directly to the Council had to do with incorporating the protection of cultural 
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heritage into UN humanitarian action; security strategies, including action to 
counter terrorism; and, peacebuilding processes given ISIS’ continuing 
destruction and looting of cultural sites and artifacts. Council members may 
further ask about supplementary action that the Council could undertake to 
further diminish the capabilities of ISIS and other affiliated groups. 
Furthermore, Council members may inquire about the Secretary-General’s 
recommendation to enhance the UN response in addressing the links between 
terrorist groups and transnational organised crime, as well as whether the 
Council could play a more active role in this regard. 
In addition, Council members may take this opportunity to inquire about the 
Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism released on 
24 December 2015 (A/70/674). They may decide to ask for clarification on the 
role of the Council in developing a global framework for preventing violent 
extremism, beyond ensuring the implementation of Resolution 1624 that 
called upon member states to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist 
act or acts. Some members may be interested in how to operationalise the 
Secretary-General’s recommendation to integrate preventing violent 
extremism into relevant activities of UN peace operations in accordance with 
their mandates. 
Ultimately, the attempts to combat terrorism and the financing thereof have 
involved the alternative to improve security measures, the establishment of 
mechanism to control governmental resources with the objective to ensure 
efficient and rapid response by the authorities to terrorist incidents. It is 
further required to redefine data collection and retrieval systems to assist in 
identifying terrorist suspects by helping to expedite decision-making through 
making relevant information available to any governmental crisis teams and 
authorities established to deal with terrorist incidents (Bell in Lodge, 1981:6). 
 
67 
 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology and Data Collection 
 
2.1 Research methodology 
Research methodology is the systematic, theoretical analysis of the methods 
that will be applied to a field of study, or the theoretical analysis of the body 
of methods and principles associated with a branch of knowledge (Berg, 2009). 
The research methodology that was proposed for this study is discussed in 
detail pertaining to the research methods that was followed, the research 
design, including strategies, instruments and the way in which the data was 
collected and analysed, clearly highlighting the stages and processes in the 
study. 
 
2.2 Research methodology in this research 
The research methodology that was followed was mainly qualitative of nature 
with descriptive and interpretive analysis of secondary data analysis from 
various sources to provide evidence that there is an increase in terrorist 
activities on the African continent, especially North, West and East Africa.   
Additionally, there was an in-depth analysis of the three major terror groups 
that operate in these areas and the way they finance their activities. This was 
complimented with the different resolutions that have been undertaken by 
the AU and the UNSC to combat terror and the financing thereof on the 
African continent. There was a specific focus on the co-operation between the 
UNSC and the AU related to terrorism and the various counter measures that 
is in place to deal with the challenge of terrorism and the financing thereof. 
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In order to support the secondary data, empirical data collection was 
conducted by piloting unstructured interviews with open ended questions 
with subject matter experts within the academic and operational field. 
Ultimately, the data was presented to either support or contradict the 
assumption that the current role of UNSC in combating the financing of 
terrorism in North, East and West Africa is not sufficient and effective with a 
main proposal that the UNSC needs to reconsider its approach to counter 
terrorism and the financing of terrorism on the African continent.  
All this information was presented in a well-structured and scientifically-
compiled research report. 
 
2.3 Research design 
The research design derives from the structure that enhanced data collection 
and analysis. The purpose of research design is to ensure that the evidence 
obtained enables the researcher to answer the research questions as 
unambiguously as possible. It was vital to obtain relevant information by 
specifying the type of evidence that was required to support the attempt to 
answer the research question.   
The research design that was followed by this study did an analysis of terror 
groups active in North, West and East Africa and how these groups finance 
their activities, with an underlying objective to ascertain if the current role of 
the UNSC is sufficient in combating the financing of terrorism. A comparative 
analysis was drawn in terms of how the UNSC, together with the African 
Union, co-operate and integrate their efforts in combating terror activities on 
the continent by reviewing the current combating methods deployed on the 
continent. 
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The result of the literature review was tested by conducting unstructured 
interviews to corroborate the outcome of the research. 
 
2.4 Data collection 
Data was collected mainly from secondary data by analysing documentation 
and review of literature. This was further enhanced by unstructured 
interviews of individuals regarded as experts in the academic and operational 
field of terrorism, conflict resolution and anti-terror operations, the AU and 
UN.  Additional to this, interviews from individuals from Civil Society and 
NGO’s were instrumental in the fight against terror. 
Thus, the main data collection methods used in this research were secondary 
data and interviews. 
 
2.5 Data validation 
In order to give quality, credibility and trustworthiness to this qualitative 
research, triangulation, saturation and member checking was used to enhance 
the outcome of this research. 
Qualitative research is inherently interactive and the immediate analysis of 
data allowed for a progressive focus on subsequent interviews and 
observations. This also assisted the researcher to test emerging conclusions 
due to the fact that the fight against terrorism and the combating of the 
financing thereof is an evolving topic.  Unlike quantitative research, sampling 
or statistical manipulation could not be used to control validity threats. 
Henceforth, validity threats were eliminated during the research phase. 
There are two broad types of validity challenges: research biasness and 
reactivity.  
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The validation strategies used to enhance the quality of data and information 
was the identification and analysis of cases not fit to a specific theory or 
interpretation, but could represent a wide range of ideologies, e.g. the regime 
theories. This also allowed the researcher to make a valid assessment about 
whether it was advisable and reasonable to retain or modify the conclusion. 
In the case of this research, the conclusion was retained as the secondary data 
from literature and the valuation of the interview corresponded and confirmed 
the assumptions made in the research methodology and the hypothesis. The 
data and information obtained from interviews was further validated by 
ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of the interviewees was guaranteed, 
which allowed the interviewees to participate more freely and openly. The 
comments and inputs from interviewees are protected by only referring to 
Person A or B. 
Triangulations were supported by collecting information from a diverse range 
of individual experts on terror in the academic and operational field from 
different universities on the African continent, civil society, settings and 
institutions in government structures, non-governmental structures, 
independent researchers and journalists and experts in the developmental 
field. A variety of methods was also used, for example interviews, 
documentary assessments and in-depth analysis, thus a mix method of 
secondary data. Saturation was applied in the sense that the collection and 
analysis of data was mainly focused on three main terrorist groups in North, 
West and East Africa that formed part of this research. In the analysis it was 
also explained why this is the point of saturation, which was due to the fact 
that these are the main active areas on the African continent where terrorist 
activities are taking place, involving the most prevalent groups, according to 
media reports and supported and evidence provided by this research. 
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2.6 Limitations of the research 
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998:44) also identify limitations of this field in 
the sense that there is little conceptual literature on threats. In discussing the 
concept of security, some contributors claim an actor-based threat is a 
precondition for something to be a security problem. It is not easy to identify 
this as a logical step, even though it could be an empirical connection, a 
structural tendency making threats attributes to actors easier to securitise. 
Security problems do not want to be defined in such a way that actors have to 
be the problem. The assumption is that they usually are. This emanates from 
the general securitisation perspective of attributing security problems to 
specific sources rather than the actual origins of what appear to be the 
security problem.   
A limitation of this research was the sensitivity of the topic. Many experts in 
the field and in some institutions were not at liberty to share their experiences 
and observations due to the fact that some of the information is classified and 
in the interest of national security, especially the contributors from CISSA. 
Another limitation of the research was the fact that the field of terrorism is 
an evolving topic, which means a number of significant incidents and 
activities took place while this research was in progress. Some of these 
developments could have easily affected the direction and/or outcome of the 
research. 
Lastly, it is important to emphasise that this is an academic study in order to 
obtain an academic qualification and that the objective is not in any way to 
expose, embarrass or offend any individual, state or organisation. 
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2.7 Research strategy 
In an attempt to answer the below research question there was an evaluation 
of the co-operation between the UNSC and the AU PSC and the measures that 
are in place to combat terror and the financing of terrorism on the African 
continent. In addition to that, there was also an assessment on how these two 
organisations collaborate with the US as a leading actor in combating terror. 
There was a specific focus on the role of AFRICOM in combating terror on the 
continent and the influence of the member states in the fight against terror. 
A large part of this assessment focused on the financing of terror activities 
and terrorism as a phenomenon.  
The supporting motivation for this study was to establish if the UNSC 
approach to war on terror on the African continent was still relevant in 
addressing the challenges that the continent faces in response to combating 
terror activities, with a specific focus on the financing of terrorism. It was also 
important to establish if the counter measures are effective in assisting 
African states and organisations in combating the financing of terror. There 
was also an evaluation of steps that can be taken to increase and enhance 
counter measures in order to strengthen co-operation between African 
countries.  
The research strategy refers to the general plan of how the researcher went 
about answering the research question. It also refers to the general 
orientation to conduct research. There are a number of research strategies 
that can be followed, hence it is critical that the one chosen is relevant to this 
field of research and that it will provide the platform for the collection of 
relevant information and data. This strategy did include in-depth analysis 
and unstructured interviews. Thus, the research was mainly qualitative in 
nature. 
73 
 
This research mainly focused on the comparative analysis of secondary data 
as a research strategy because it provided a platform to do an empirical 
inquiry that allowed for the investigation of a contemporary phenomenon like 
terror within its historical context and in its real-life presence. These 
enquiries are normally associated with contemporary phenomena and can also 
be used in current analysis in order to understand why a specific phenomenon 
manifests itself in a specific manner in this contemporary setting. This was 
critically important in explaining the phenomenon of terror and the fact that 
terror has increasingly become a contemporary phenomenon. The Global 
Terrorism Barometer of 2014 was used to emphasise this statement. 
The analysis had the capability to accommodate different research techniques 
and was generally used when it was required to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of a specific phenomenon. This research strategy did certainly 
enhance the understanding of terror on the African continent and the 
response of the UNSC to this phenomenon and the financing thereof. The fact 
that it accommodated both qualitative and quantitative research data made 
it easier to collect data or use existing secondary data and allow for a mixed-
method strategy to be easily accommodated. This also supported the 
conclusion of Yen (2003) that there are a number of areas where research 
techniques overlap.  
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Chapter 3: Framework of Analysis 
 
The purpose of this report is to focus on a conceptual framework addressing 
the dynamic and adaptive capacity of the UNSC towards terrorist activities 
on the African continent. It will focus on the financing of these activities, 
especially in the light of increased terror attacks on the continent, especially 
in North, West and East Africa. The multi-level erudition influencing formal 
and informal institutions, the role of state and non-state actors, the nature of 
multi-level interaction, the increasingly important role of bureaucratic 
hierarchies, markets and networks are identified as major structural 
characteristics of the regimes on this continent.  In addition, the research will 
also focus on the key components of what is known about the relationship 
between crime and terrorism.  
The international security environment has been going through some 
significant changes and the way security threats are being perceived at times 
leaves a question about the correlation between crime and terrorism 
(Makarenko, 2012:234). This perception is based on the belief that organised 
crime and terrorist groups would not find common causes for their activities 
due to the inherent differences between political/ideological motivations and 
profit maximisation, which is too significant. Evidence indicated the contrary. 
After the 9/11 incident, there is a significant belief that there is a link between 
crime and terrorism (Makarenko, 2012:10). 
In the assessment between crime and terrorism, it may be suggested that the 
depth of the relationship often dependents on the nature of the geographical 
region in which the relationship is established (Makarenko, 2012:237). This 
provides the framework for why, when and how a relationship between crime 
and terrorism emerges. There are three main catalysts identified with the 
potential to transform a politically motivated terrorist group into one that is 
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motivated primarily by profit maximisation: destruction of leadership 
structures, political transformation and opportunities for financial gain. 
These components are so vast that they are subsumed within an alternative 
framework. An additional eight characteristics are identified by Jackson 
(Makarenko, 2012:237) in a study on organised crimes within terrorist groups. 
These characteristics are identified as structure and command relations, 
group culture, resources devoted to learning, connections to knowledge 
sources, group operational environment, stability of membership, absorptive 
capacity for new knowledge and the nature of communications mechanisms. 
Anarumo (in Kennedy and McGarrell, 2011:56) argues that the study of 
terrorism should reside primarily within the criminal justice system, mainly 
because civilian law enforcement agencies will ultimately be responsible for 
the prevention of and recovery from terrorist acts. Literature (Kennedy, 2011: 
57) suggests that civilian police agencies possess unique capabilities to deal 
with terrorism. It further states that the threat of terrorism remains local and 
therefore proper mitigation strategies must also be local and current.  
The explanatory models, as explained by Arena and Arrigo (2004), were 
developed to help explain and understand the various dynamics of the 
relationship between crime and terrorism. These models were created from 
the assessment of historical and contemporary case studies. The following 
definitional framework can be used to define the relationship between crime 
and terrorism: alliance, appropriation of tactics, convergence (integration and 
hybrid) and transformation (Anarumo in Kennedy and McGarrell, 2011:56). 
Harmon (2000:1) highlights that terrorism is always about power and the 
creation of terror and describes it as the deliberate, systematic murder, 
maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends, of 
which the major objectives are anarchism (destruction of state authority, e.g. 
Libya and partially Nigeria), communism (commitment to lengthy stage of 
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government through anti-establishment, anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist, 
e.g. Angola), neo-fascism (revolutionary overturn of governments, e.g. South 
Africa), national separatism (dedication to race, e.g. Rwanda), religion 
(religious motivated violence, e.g. Hamas) and pro-state terrorism (to 
maintain the power of the state, e.g. Algeria). 
Terrorists use different strategies to achieve their goals. It is these very 
strategies that set terrorism apart from other criminal activities, simply 
because they have different end-states in mind. In 1998, Osama Bin Laden 
took religio-political terrorism to Africa. This was particularly focused on the 
North of the continent, mainly because of the lack of military defence 
structures in these countries. Terrorism cells gained strength in Africa, 
particular in Saudi-Arabia. The level of operational skill was manifested in 
the simultaneous bombs at US embassies in both Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 
(Harmon, 2000:52). 
Other tactics include political strategies aiming to destroy political power by 
making the government look incapable to deal with terrorism, e.g. civilian 
airline hijackings and hostage takings. Other propaganda techniques include 
the use of radio, television and lately social media by terror groups, as 
demonstrated with ISIS and the Arab Spring. Economic strategies used by 
terrorists are not just to strengthen their grip on the regime, but also to fund 
their activities, e.g. highway “tax”, sabotage of oil pipelines and bombings as 
seen in Nigeria, extortion, the under-reporting of terrorist campaigns at 
tourist attractions, e.g. the bomb in Cape Town at Planet Hollywood in August 
of 1998, which all eventually affects state resources with police, hospitals and 
other emergency services that need to respond to these incidents (Harmon, 
2000:63). The more recent 26 June 2015 bombings in Tunis, Sousse holiday 
resort, had a direct influence on the economy of the country sourced from 
tourism. 
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At the end the question that remains is: what is the cost of terrorism? 
Looking at current trend and future threats, based on the Global Terrorism 
Index of 2015, terrorism is here to stay. Hence this study which attempts to 
highlight the role of the UNSC towards the combating of the financing of 
terrorism. There are several suggestions on possible amendments to the 
current measures to combat terrorism in order to match current trends.  
North, West and East Africa face major political challenges, which provides a 
conducive environment and breeding ground for terrorist activities. The 
prevalence of nationalism is also a factor that boosts terrorism, due to the fact 
that deep and wide ethnic differences still exist and may even grow in the 
absence of coherent political ideology. Environmentalism, which highlights 
some ‘non-political’ challenges, leads to a number of cross-border attacks and 
regional instability. This is evident in the clashes between the Fulani 
herdsmen and Boko Haram in Nigeria (Omitola, 2014). 
Global instability increased significantly after 1992, which may influence the 
increase in terrorist activities. The role of peacekeeping forces and 
humanitarian operations are also under threat as peace-keepers and 
personnel have increasingly become favourite targets for kidnappings and 
killings by terrorist groups. This is demonstrated by ISIS. Anger against Jews 
and Israelis has kept the flame of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist sentiment 
burning as a significant factor in global terrorism. State resources of future 
terrorism will be challenged in the way states are able to co-ordinate these 
resources to either fight or support terrorist activities.  
Lastly, technologies and tactics of terrorism in the next decade prove to be the 
threat of the individual or small groups with simple automatic weapons. 
Terrorist groups are no longer large communities or groups, but rather 
individuals and small groups that, with the right weapon, can cause the same 
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harm and effect as a large attack (Harmon, 2000:160). The Paris attacks in 
November 2015 was a clear demonstration thereof.  
Krasner (1983:372) defines the regime as a set of explicit or implicit 
"principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area". This definition is intentionally 
broad, and covers human interaction ranging from formal organisations (i.e. 
OPEC) to informal groups (i.e. major banks during the debt crisis). Note that 
a regime need not be composed of states. 
Regime theory seeks to explain the factors and circumstances under which 
states co-operate. It further examines the role of power, especially hegemonic 
power, in the creation and maintenance of regimes. This supports the theory 
of realism in that it emphasises the close relationship between the emergence 
of institutions and the distribution of power, but is contrary to the rationalist 
regime theory, which states that power alone cannot explain the emergence 
or impact of institutions. What remains fundamental, is the role of power and 
its coercion in the implementation of rules. This is evident in the most 
distinctive contribution of regime theory, which is the idea of self-interest and 
reciprocal benefit. This is demonstrated by ECOWAS and the formation of 
Financial Action Task Force and GIABA (Inter-Governmental Action Group 
Against Money Laundering) (Hurrell, 1995:55). 
The challenge is to explain the existence of co-operation based on the realistic 
assumption that states act from self-interest, competing in a world of anarchy 
and that co-operation does not rely on altruism, which can be developed from 
calculations of instrumental rational actors. This links to functional benefits 
that always formed part of the explanation of the existence of co-operation 
between states, which adds to Vattel’s “voluntary law of nations”, highlighting 
common safety, mutual correspondence and reciprocal duties Hurrell 
(1995:56). 
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Hurrell (1995) highlights that regime change cannot be described as a fad, as 
some of the international critics want to describe it. The reason being the 
fundamental question in International Relations on how co-operation is 
possible between states claiming their sovereignty, but at the same time 
competing for power and influence in a situation of anarchy. Many similar and 
different answers have been given in an attempt to answer this question. This 
is evident in an increase of international societies and regional organisations 
that strive to form an international society in pursue of common goals and 
objectives, e.g. the AU and ECOWAS.  
The above argument is based on the opinions that states are less vulnerable 
than individuals, with less fear of death than they are of resources and power. 
In the light of rationality, states will be less tempted to destroy each other 
than individuals. States will develop a minimal set of rules for co-existence, 
based on self-interest and rational caution (Hurrell, 1995:50).  
Regime theory also struggles with the relationship between law and norms 
versus power and interest. Many scholars argue that rules and norms of 
international life are purely a reflection of the power and interest of states. 
These arguments are based on classical international law which highlights 
that the role of custom and practices in the creation of legal rules, e.g. treaties, 
whilst there is no restrain on the right to wage war. The definition of state 
sovereignty has no place for self-determination or the rights of citizens 
(Hurrell, 1995:51). 
Derby (1987) identified, as early as in the late 80s, that the efforts to co-
ordinate the criminal law system globally to supress the successes of terrorist 
activities can be accounted to the hypocrisy amongst nations. This is evident 
in the fact that terrorism is seen as a crime to some nations, whilst to others 
it is almost an act of heroism. In this light it is apparent that many nations 
have similar views towards the conduct of such activities, but even like-
80 
 
minded nations and groups of nations have done little to weld their legal 
systems into a common anti-terrorism mechanism.  
This brings back the definition of a regime; implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor’s 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Hurrell, 
1995:54). Keohane (in Hurrel) refers to a regime as an institution with explicit 
rules, agreed upon by governments, which pertain to particular sets of issues 
in international relations. The above two definitions bring regime theory and 
international law much closer than academics would like to acknowledge. 
 
3.1 The difference between regime theory and international law? 
The most basic difference between regime theory and international law is that 
states obey rules that are usually unenforced and mostly unenforceable. The 
reason for this is power and coercion, self-determination and reciprocal 
benefits, institutionalised habit or inertia, the existence of a sense of 
community, procedural legitimacy of the process of rule creation, or the moral 
suasion that derives from a shared sense of justice (Hurrell, 1995:55). 
As much as regime theory provides fertile grounds for understanding 
international relations, there are a number of weaknesses identified and 
associated with this theory. The first concern is the relationship of specific 
bargains and bargaining processes to the broader international context and to 
the broader structures of the international system, because inter-state 
bargaining is famously concerned with relative gains and distribution of cost 
and benefit of co-operation (Hurrell, 1995:55). 
Secondly, the sense of community and the emergence of co-operation is based 
on a moral rather than a legal dimension. Parties believe that they form part 
of a shared project or community in which there is a common interest that can 
be enhanced by co-operative behaviour. This is quite evident in the pursuit of 
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holy wars and the treatment of indigenous people where a lack of a shared 
sense of community has undermined co-operative limitations on conflict based 
on reciprocity and self-interest (Hurrell, 1995:62).  
Thirdly, justice and order is another point of concern as many international 
norms derive compliance from a shared sense of justice, human rights and 
norms against armed conquest and the invasion of territory. In this case, rules 
and norms do not develop due to the direct interplay between states or 
functional benefits, but rather because of moral awareness of individuals 
within states. Order and justice are therefore separately tracked (Hurrell, 
1995:62). 
Lastly, the domestic dimension is explained outside the theories of 
interdependence and transnationalism, which stresses the multiple links 
between domestic and international co-operation. Domestic issues remain 
central in the explanation or resolution of community and societal domestic 
political systems (Hurrell, 1995:62). 
The role of international law in the policy-making process, the technical links 
between international law, domestic legal systems, the complexities in the 
implementation of international rules and lastly, the political cost of violating 
international rules are affecting and have a direct influence on domestic 
societies. 
 
3.2 The effectiveness of regime theory 
International environmental regimes – especially those regimes articulated in 
multilateral environmental agreements – have been a subject of intense 
interest within the scientific community over the last three decades. However, 
there are substantial differences of opinion regarding the effectiveness of 
these governance systems or the degree to which they are successful in solving 
the problems leading to their creation. The international environment is 
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generally one of anarchy dominated by states where there is no authority that 
makes states play nice with each other. Nevertheless, states are not the only 
actors on the world stage today, and there is oftentimes co-operation between 
the actors. Regime theory attempts to explain these realities.  
Regime theory argues that power in the international system is distributed 
across different states and non-state actors, such as non-governmental 
organisations, intergovernmental organisations, and multinational 
companies, that co-operate on specific issues based upon a set of international 
regimes. Regimes are the manifestation of co-operation among actors in the 
international system. A regime can be thought of as a rulebook that covers a 
specific area of international relations upon which most of the players agree 
to abide with general areas of co-operation. Let's look at a quick example of a 
regime.  
Our current system of international trade can be viewed as a regime. The 
principles, rules and norms of our international system of trade revolve 
around free trade, globalisation, diplomacy to resolve trade issues, and the 
creation of international trade organisations, such as the WTO. Most states 
participate and co-operate within this trade regime (Young, 1999: 285).  
The study of regime theory can be divided into different approaches, namely 
a power-based approach, an interest-based approach, and a knowledge-based 
approach. The power-based approach, sometimes referred to as neorealism, of 
regime theory attempts to explain international regimes in terms of the 
distribution of power among the most relevant actors of particular 
international policy. It assumes that states and other actors act rationally. 
Hegemonic-stability theory is one of the most well-known power-based 
approaches in international regime theory. In a nutshell, HST suggests that 
a hegemon, a country that dominates all others, will encourage the 
development of regimes that are consonant with its interests to develop 
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support for its policies without the expense of forcing its will on other states 
using more costly means, such as economic sanctions or force. For example, 
the United States has played a large role in fashioning a global financial and 
economic system that aligns with its interests and values. Of course, the 
hegemon will not permit the formation of any regime contrary to its interests. 
For example, the US will not permit an economic regime that discourages free 
trade (Young, 1999:297). 
Keep in mind that a regime is not an all-encompassing set of principles that 
govern the entire international system, like the concept of state sovereignty. 
Instead, under the theory, regimes focus on specific areas of international life, 
like our trade example, nuclear proliferation, international finance, and 
security (Young, 1999:320).  
The main important aspect of regime effectiveness is state compliance. States 
calculate not only the gains against the cost from international co-operation, 
but also compare net benefits against those of their partner-competitors. The 
neoliberal-utilitarian approach further assumes that states prefer higher 
certainty for the course of future competition and calculate costs and benefits 
accordingly. Pure institutionalism maintains that states comply simply 
because the regime exists (Guzman, 2002:1860). 
The perspective from the theories of knowledge regimes creates a framework 
for states to learn, whereby states can test their assumptions based on the 
behaviour and adequacy of the instruments of co-operation.  
Lastly, the complex institutional theory sees regimes embedded in general 
networks of norms and institutions. Compliance only happens because the 
normative system of higher order serves as a frame of reference that reinforce 
compliance in specific regimes (Guzman, 2002:1870). 
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Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Research Data 
 
 “You cannot fix the problem of terrorism without fixing the state” – Hussein 
Solomon 
 
The results of the research remain an eye-opening experience. When this 
research started off, there was a feeling of despair to a certain extent due to 
the fact this is a challenging topic and above all, governments, organisations 
and individuals may not feel at liberty to share information. 
On the contrary, the road travelled was a surprising one and the researcher 
was at certain points humbled by the wealth of information and the extent to 
which scholars, civil society and organisations opened their doors in order to 
share information, data and experiences.  
Literature on the topic was vast and of high quality. The interviews were more 
intriguing. Experts and academics shared information and data, 
organisations shared experiences and as the journey continued, it became 
quite evident that the financing of terrorism is a topic that still needs a lot of 
research. In addition, a number of assumptions are made in the literature, but 
very little evidence is available to back up these assumptions. 
During the interviews, it became evident that the lack of a definition of 
terrorism should not be seen as an excuse not to respond to the phenomenon. 
Another reason given for the lack of a unified definition is the lack of a 
conformed approach and a difference in value systems to the combating of 
terrorism. Some interviewees believe that the lack of a definition is just an 
academic challenge and that it should not limit actions against terror acts. 
Another respondent indicated that terrorists should be treated in the way they 
define themselves, which is an indication that there should be a focus on the 
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act of terrorism, instead of trying to define what a terrorist is. There was also 
an attempt to suggest that the AU’s definition of terrorism is thus far the best 
definition to use. Some of the respondents also warned against making the 
mistake of treating terrorism and extremism as the same phenomenon. There 
is a suggestion that components of terror should be identified in order to assist 
with the definition of terrorism. 
Michael Olufemi Sodipo (2015:3) explains that redressing violent extremism 
requires “interventions at every stage of the radicalization spectrum, from the 
measured use of force, to proactive development investments to alleviate 
socioeconomic grievances, countering extremist ideologies, and rehabilitating 
individuals who have been radicalized.” He also calls for alternative dispute 
resolution approaches such as those that actively engage youth and other at-
risk groups in peace-building programmes to instil values of tolerance, 
diminish prejudice, and mitigate the appeal of radical ideologies. This idea is 
supported by interviews conducted at CISSA and the AU where it became 
evident that the UNSC rely increasingly on the successes of AMISOM 
operations in Somalia. The AU Peacekeeping operation was forced to review 
the way they do business in Somalia in order to ensure that they always stay 
a step ahead of Al-Shabaab. AMISOM made significant inroads in combating 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia, to the extent that the US is re-establishing diplomatic 
ties with Somalia. The change in policy direction was also confirmed with an 
interview at the policy unit of the AU.   
Radicalisation is more about “who you know” notes Noureddine Jebnoun. “It 
leverages feelings of isolation from society and uses indoctrination to fill this 
void and create a sense of new belonging. Combating it requires recognition of 
the role of civil society and larger social movements and the integration of 
development, education, civil and political rights, common citizenship and 
political activism,” (Jebnoun, 2015:2). This was confirmed with the 
interviewee of the Peacekeeping Missions unit of the AU. According to this 
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interviewee, the UNSC increasingly proxy African problems to the AU 
because the UNSC became to understand that African can deal better with 
Africa’s challenges due to the fact that Africans understand their challenges 
better.  
Similarly, Dr Benjamin Nickels, Associate Professor and Academic Chair, 
Transnational Threats and Counterterrorism calls attention to the 
importance of focusing on “the unintended consequences of counterterrorism 
operations” and how they undermine counter-terrorism objectives. “We 
continue to see cases of repression in the manner in which some of these 
operations are carried out, which creates more instability and lends itself to 
exploitation by terrorist organizations,” he cautions. He also warns that 
overreliance by international partners on counterterrorism partners who 
pursue repression at home could inadvertently exacerbate local drivers of 
instability (Nickels in Jebnoun, 2015:3). This thought is echoed by Dr Omitola.  
Concurring with the aforementioned, The Global Terrorism Index of 2015 
highlights that the two factors, namely political violence and the existence of 
a  broader armed conflict, is very closely associated with terrorism. The report 
further states that less than 0.6 percent of all terrorist attacks have occurred 
in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror. In 
OECD countries socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, 
confidence in the press, belief in democracy, drug crime and attitudes towards 
immigration are the most statistical significant factors correlating with 
terrorism, while in non-OECD countries, factors such as historical armed 
conflict, ongoing internal conflict, corruption and a weak business 
environment are more strongly correlated with terrorism. Common 
denominators between these countries are a low respect for human rights, the 
existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political 
instability and a lower respect for the UN and EU (Global Terrorism Index, 
2015:3). 
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Data from interviews provides different theories for the existence of terrorism. 
As a start, there is a caution to differentiate between domestic and 
transnational terrorism. On interviewee indicated that it is also important to 
understand that it is easier to fight individuals rather than organisations: 
“Organisations do not commit terrorist acts, but individuals do.” Other causes 
highlighted by interviewees are corruption, lack of political will, domestic 
societal challenges, and lack of rule of law, current conflict situations in 
countries, lucrative incentives for criminal activities, lack of resources in 
domestic societies, unemployment, low levels of education (see Figure 12: 
Nigerian Map: Education, Governance, Peace and Security in Appendix page 127) 
and the level of radicalisation. Mainly all interviewees agreed that 
governments need to address domestic challenges in order to ensure that the 
level of radicalisation is contained and does not provide for a conducive 
condition to support the emergence of terrorism. 
This research further highlighted the fact that the approaches and role of the 
UNSC and the AU in combating the financing of terrorism is not sufficient in 
dealing with the bane of terrorism. A number of failures and gaps have been 
discussed and used as examples and references. The interviewees from the 
CISSA office confirmed this statement. Interviewees emphasised that Africa 
needs to own up to its challenges and needs to establish common ground on 
how, where and when to respond to the difficulty of terrorism. Africa should 
stop requesting financial assistance from foreign donors to fight terrorism, as 
these donations come with conditions and consequences on how, where and 
when to spend it. In some instances these conditions are not in line with the 
objectives of the country or do not take local laws and regulations into 
consideration.  
There is also significant mistrust between African states and as a result, this 
obstructs co-ordination of intelligence and information. The fact that African 
states do not take the AU serious is another challenge identified by CISSA. 
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For as long as member states see the AU as a “toothless dog”, the AU will not 
successfully execute its objectives. This is also a reflection that African states 
do not regards themselves as part of the problem, by not having a sense of 
belonging to the AU. CISSA also highlights that some states still believe that 
they do not have a terrorist issue and therefore do not prioritise combating 
initiatives. This is echoed in the May 2015 Policy document of the Policy 
Research Unit of DIRCO. 
Interviewees further underlined that the resolutions from the UNSC in 
addressing the financing of terrorism is an important aspect, due to the fact 
that it provides countries and states with the required international legal 
framework to initiate domestic laws and regulations against the financing of 
terrorism. The major challenge remains implementation of these resolutions. 
Contrary to the aforementioned, it is mentioned by the interviewees that the 
AU does not have the capacity nor the resources to respond to the challenges 
of terrorism on the continent. Evidence is the request to France to intervene 
in the Malian crisis, as well as the kidnapping of the school girls by Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. On the bright side, regional bodies like ECOWAS made 
some significant strides in combating the financing of terrorism. It was 
concluded that there are challenges at all levels, namely UNSC, AU and 
domestic, to ensure that the fight against the financing of terrorism is fought 
in a co-ordinated manner. An important issue emanating from the interviews 
was the fact that they recognised that regime power plays an important role 
in the fight against terrorism and they concluded that the actor with the most 
interest will lead this mission.  
According to Liang (2015:3) at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), 
the financing of ISIS indicates that the organisation is a highly effective one, 
in some instances acting as a state, which includes tax systems and oil sales. 
She continues to identify ISIS as the richest and most violent group in modern 
history, who successfully transformed terror from a regional to a global 
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security threat. This is mainly due to their ability to establish and govern a 
semi-functioning autonomous territory, the use of 21st century marketing 
tools to create an international brand, and the strategy to attract and use 
foreign fighters. Their power is also based on the unprecedented wealth, which 
is based on diverse and sophisticated financing strategies. ISIS has been 
engaged in attacks in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. 
According to the interviewees, the elimination of funds to terrorist 
organisations will not stop terrorists from executing their terror activities. 
Terrorists and their organisations will find alternative legal and illegal ways 
of funding their activities. And one of the reasons for the sustainability of 
terrorism is because the framework of responding to terrorism did not change 
over the past 30 years. In order to fight terrorism, states need to deal with the 
underlying reason why terrorism exists. Botha and Solomon (2015) agree that 
terrorism is a form of extremism and that states need to address these issues 
before they can attempt to supress the financing of terrorism, e.g. the creation 
of fake and fictitious companies, political appointees in state institutions like 
immigration, lack of sufficient border control and the existence of the informal 
economy contributes all to the funding if terrorism. It is further important to 
identify all the different sources of terrorism financing, identify the 
commonalities and design counter measures accordingly. The other challenge 
with combating the financing of terrorism is that states believe that one 
counter measure will cancel all financing methods. One interview drew 
attention to the fact that funding is not always external and that countering 
measures should also look at self-funding. A number of terrorist funding 
comes from internal sources and therefore there is no formal way of countering 
this method. In some instances, funding comes from legitimate sources. How 
will states deal with legitimate funding of terrorist groups? 
The level of substance of knowledge and information from the interviews were 
quite high and the interviewees almost agreed on the position of counter 
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terrorism on the African continent. They all agreed that governance, social 
cohesion, the integrity of security forces and government institutions, 
corruption, inclusion and diversity need to form part of the solution, which 
should be a combination of bottom-up and top-down approaches and 
strategies. What was of particular interest during this research was that all 
interviewees concluded that the counter intelligence agencies should shift 
their focus from designing and implementing resolutions and rather focus on 
enhanced collaboration strategic approaches in order to deal with an ever 
changing and adapting terrorist environment.  
The Global Terrorism Report of 2015 highlights that in 2014, the total number 
of deaths from terrorism increased by 80% when compared to 2013, which is 
the largest yearly increase in the past 15 years. This is a clear indication and 
evidence that terrorism is on the increase and is highly concentrated on the 
African continent with a major intensification in Nigeria. This country 
experienced the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any 
country, with Boko Haram being the most deadly terrorist group in the world. 
In March 2016, Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIS, now also known 
as the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP) (Global Terrorist Index, 
2015:2).  
As highlighted by Person A and Person B in their interviews, states identify 
two major factors associated with terrorist activities, namely political violence 
committed by the state and the existence of a broader sense of the lack of the 
rule of law. 
Although there seems to be a general agreement on the causes of terrorism, 
there also seem to be a general understanding that the approaches to this 
phenomenon need to adapt and that the solutions may be right in front of us 
by addressing education, culture and bringing back moral value systems, 
instead of high-level resolutions. As much as these resolution provide a 
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framework for states to fight terrorism in the international arena, 
governments need to keep it conventional and modest and address basic 
ailments in the society. 
The analysis of the research completed was critical in support of the 
understanding of the findings and conclusions. The degree to which the data 
is presented, together with the analysis of that information is important to 
the extent that the reader and audience will either agree or disagree if the 
research question was answered and the research problem was addressed.  
Grasping the phenomenon under study was also very critical, especially in the 
light of the lack of a unified, common definition. Data from the literature and 
interviews continued to agree that the lack of a unified definition should not 
stop counter measures from being implemented, as there is a definite shift 
towards identifying the act of terror, rather than trying to define a terrorist. 
Additional to that, there was a significant move towards dealing with 
terrorism as a criminal phenomenon rather than a social problem. This is a 
very important phenomenon that was uncovered during the research, and 
continued to surface during interviews and data analysis.   
Synthesising a portrait of the phenomenon that accounts for relations and 
linkages within its aspects accounts for the conclusion that terrorism is here 
to stay. The inherent structures, operations, networks and functionality of the 
different terrorist groups that were researched, allows for a representation of 
the reality that allows for the reader to completely understand and 
comprehend the dilemma and challenge that exist in the combating of the 
financing of terrorism. The different linkages, relations and processes that 
were presented during this research, brought a new understanding of how 
terrorist finance their activities and why it is so difficult for the international 
actors, organisations and groups to combat this phenomenon. 
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All interviewees except for one, agreed that terrorism is here to stay. As long 
as there are divides along racial, tribal and religious lines, terrorism will find 
its place in society. The reasons provided were the lack of good governance, 
structures and institutions and political will, will not support an environment 
to fight terrorism and the funding thereof. Grievances embedded in society 
will also provide for supportive circumstances for the existence of terrorism. 
One interviewee highlighted that for as long as there is money to be made 
from terrorism, this phenomenon is not going anywhere. In addition, there are 
no tools or support structures on a regional and/or domestic level to implement 
UNSC resolutions.  
The analysis of the information and data by assessing different theories in an 
attempt to understand why the phenomenon of terrorist financing exists and 
the importance to understand the reality thereof, will allow the different 
stakeholders to better plan, respond and combat this phenomenon. Theorising 
about how and why these relations appear as they do, allowed for secondary 
analysis in an attempt to answer the original research question. In order to 
support that, meta-analysis was also applied in order to ascertain and ensure 
that the analysis of previous studies, findings and data are incorporated in 
this research. This does not only allow for the review of previous studies, data 
and findings, but this is important to ensure that indicators and deviations 
can be observed and brought forth to be presented as new findings or 
conclusions. This will also support a change in theories or a change in certain 
conclusion that was reached with previous research. This was particularly 
evident in the conceptualisation of terrorism. At some point in the literature 
there is clear evidence that terrorism was regarded or even, in some instances, 
confused with extremism. More and more research are emphasising the point 
that terrorism is but one form of extremism.   
It was further important to underline the difference between formal and 
informal financing of terrorist activities. Literature and previous research has 
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mainly focused on the formal methods of financing terrorism, until further 
research highlighted the importance of informal methods and that these 
methods are increasingly becoming prevalent, due to the fact that they are 
less vulnerable to tracking and tracing. Also, when looking at the financing of 
terrorism, there is a general belief and assumption that cash is involved, but 
literature exposed the many different ways terrorists finance their activates.  
This led to re-contextualisation, or putting the new knowledge about 
phenomena and relations back into the context of how others have articulated 
the evolving knowledge.  
The categories of the definition and approaches to terrorism, financing 
methods and techniques and the different counter measures became saturated 
and the new connections that emerged was the continuous realisation and 
acknowledgement that combating terrorism is more domestic matter 
supported by international and regional organisations and structures and 
that the UNSC need to attempt new strategy in combating the financing of 
terrorism. Additional information was gathered via theoretical sampling and 
the substantial concept was that the UNSC need to strengthen governments 
and institutions within states in order to combat the financing of terrorism on 
a domestic level. 
Because data collection and analysis processes tend to be concurrent, with 
new analytic steps informing the process of additional data collection and new 
data informing the analytic processes, it was important to recognise that 
qualitative data analysis processes are not entirely distinguishable from the 
actual data. The theoretical lens from which the researcher approaches the 
phenomenon, the strategies that the researcher uses to collect or construct 
data, and the understandings that the researcher has about what might count 
as relevant or important data in answering the research question, are all 
analytic processes that influence the data. Hence open-ended question were 
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ask during the interviews in order to provide the interviewees with a platform 
to express their thoughts, knowledge and experiences in such a way that it 
will complement the research process in an attempt to answer the research 
question. 
Analysis also occurs as an explicit step in conceptually interpreting the data 
set as a whole, using specific analytic strategies to transform the raw data 
into a new and coherent depiction of the phenomenon being studied. This was 
specifically evident in the assessment of the three terrorist groups identified 
as part of the comparative analysis. As much as there was an attempt to 
assess the groups on the same basis and components, it was evident very early 
in the research that the dynamics in these groups are so vast, that it would be 
difficult to compare them in the same approach.  
This was further confirmed during the data analysis of the financing 
techniques used by these different groups. Due to the fact that they inherently 
differ based on philosophy, convictions, objectives and approaches, the way 
they handle their finance was evident during the research. It is basically only 
the terrorist techniques and activities that place them all in the same basket 
and being classified as terrorist groups. This links with the developments in 
the definition that terrorist groups and individuals should rather be convicted 
on their acts and not necessarily on their believes, conviction and objectives. 
One interviewee from the AU highlighted that the approach in dealing with 
the financing of terrorism requires a top-down approach in order to ensure 
that we respond to the phenomenon in s coordinated method.  
The research also confirmed that the current counter measures employed by 
the UNSC, the AU and other regional bodies are not sufficient, even though 
they are effective to a certain extent. In certain instances the objectives of 
these counter measures are met, but mainly and overall, it is not developing 
and evolving with time and technology. This ties with the responses from all 
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interviewees, backed up by literature that the UNSC, the AU and other 
relevant stakeholders need to rethink their approach in dealing with the 
financing of terrorism. There is also an increased push for the UNSC, the AU, 
other actors and role players to redefine the targets of their combatting 
activities and programs as the unintended consequences seem to be more 
damaging that the intended consequences.  The bombings in North Africa is 
creating a refugee crisis in Europe, the implementation of different 
resolutions seems to inconvenience law abiding citizens and the regime 
change in West Africa did not have much effect on the existence of terrorism 
in these areas. In fact, looking at the different maps presented in the 
addendum, it is quite evident that the phenomenon of terrorism is spreading 
and moving towards central Africa. 
Based on the above, replication is found in this research due to the fact that 
the partial relationship is the same as the original relationship, meaning the 
assumption was that the role of the UNSC towards terrorism on the continent 
was assumed to be insufficient and not adapting with time and the new 
techniques applied by the terrorist groups in financing their activities. The 
implementation of resolutions did not assist significantly in the combating of 
the financing of terrorism. One can almost suggest a spurious relationship 
whereby the explanation is that the role of the UNSC in relation to the 
combating of the financing of terrorism is an independent relationship as this 
is depending on the successful implementation of the resolutions by regional 
organisations and local states and governments.  
This led to the conclusion on the further explorative research to be conducted, 
e.g. how the UNSC can support local states and government to fight the 
financing of terrorism, without focussing too much on the implementation of 
resolutions. It quite evident in the number of presentations at the North West 
University Conference (10-11 March 2016), named: “The Rise of Islamic 
Extremism”, that there is a serious lack of coordinated research capacity at 
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higher learning institutions that should be able to support government and 
countering institutions to combat against the extremism and the financing 
thereof, by providing government with well research policy direction and tools 
to implement resolutions. 
The implementation of UNSC resolutions need to come with clear support 
structures and tools in order to ensure the intentional objectives of the 
resolutions are met. Additional to that, regional bodies and organisations need 
to develop a new platform to ensure that all states are involve in the 
combating of terrorism and the financing thereof. SADEC claims that there is 
no significant threat of terrorism in the region, but very well acknowledge the 
existence of certain mechanisms in the region that support the financing of 
terrorism. 
On 18th March 2016 the diplomatic world was shocked to find an article in The 
New York Times whereby the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr Anthony 
Banbury, in an open letter to the UN highlighted the failures of the UN. This 
research will be deficient if there is no mention from one of the UN insiders 
on the failures of the UN. He mentioned that the world faces a series of many 
crises, of which the most prominent are climate change and terrorism. He 
continue by emphasising, and agreeing with this research, that the UN is 
uniquely placed to meet these challenges. Contrary to that, he underline a 
number of reasons why the UN is battling, and in some instances failing. 
He refers to the level of red tape and bureaucracy that makes the UN almost 
incapable of delivering its intended results. The “sclerotic personnel system”, 
result into the best talent in the world not being able to serve in situations 
and conditions where their skills can be best applied, e.g. a grievous blunder 
was made in 2013 when the UN deployed 10,000 soldiers and police officers to 
mali to respond to a terrorist takeover. This force was unprepared, had no 
training on counterterrorism and was told “not to engage”. Sadly also, more 
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than 80 percent of the resources of the force is spend on logistics and self-
protection. In 2014 in Central African Republic the UN took over 
peacekeeping operations from the African Union and had an opportunity to 
choose troop to take part in this operation. Unfortunately this decision was 
made proper debate and for cynical political reasons soldier were chosen that 
was involved in serious human rights violations. And despite reports and 
evidence confirming, the UN hardly made a whisper about these violations.  
Additional weaknesses are minimal accountability for non-compliance, 
decision driven by political expediency, instead of the values of the UN, 
peacekeeping mission that carries on for ever with no clear goals, targets and 
end dates-creating deeper socio-economic problems – costing billions of 
dollars. UN bureaucracy is a serious stumbling block for peacekeeping 
operations. 
Banbury (March 2016) refers to the UN as a “Remington typewriter” in a 
smart phone world. He further agrees with this research that unless the UN 
genuinely commits to reform, it will not succeed in the advancement of peace, 
human rights, development and the climate. The bureaucracy need to work 
with the missions, and not the other way around. There is also a solemn lack 
to “do the right thing”. 
This research originated with the role of the UNSC in combating terrorism by 
focussing on how terrorist finance their activities. There was a specific focus 
on the three most prominent group in North, West and East Africa. Data 
collection was mainly through secondary data and unstructured interviews 
with open ended questions. The interviews were coded in that the questions 
were based on three major themes, namely defining terrorism, the funding of 
terrorism and future developments whereby the role of the UNSC was 
questioned. During the interviews, the following patterns emerged and it 
became evident that there is consensus that the role of the UNSC in 
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combating the financing of terrorism is not developing with time and is 
therefore not sufficient in its response to the phenomenon on the African 
continent. The lack of a definition is not critical when responding to combating 
the financing of terrorism; terrorism should be responded to base on the 
components of the act; terrorism and crime is closer related than what some 
scholars would like to admit; there is clear move away seeing terrorism as a 
state problem and rather a manifestation of a range of societal problems, with 
its roots deep locked in extremism; all interviewees agreed that cutting the 
financing of terrorism will not stop the phenomenon; responding to terrorism 
needs an integrated, co-ordinated bottom-up and top-down approach; as much 
as the UNSC plays an important role in the combating of terrorism and the 
financing thereof, the implementation of the security council resolutions, 
together with support mechanism on regional and domestic level is of cardinal 
importance if these resolutions are to make an impact and different in the life 
of ordinary citizens feeling safe and protected from terrorism. The majority of 
the interviewees agreed that terrorism is here to stay, while the minority 
believe that terrorism will eventually fade and be replaced by another form of 
extremism.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
This research report attempted to assess the role of the UNSC in combating 
the financing of terrorism on the African Continent, focusing on ISIS in the 
North, Boko Haram in the West and Al-Shabaab in the East. This research 
demonstrated an increase in terrorist activities and that Africa can be 
considered to be the continent most regularly affected.  
In the glossary, different terms significant and explicitly associated with this 
area of research were clarified. The research problem, purpose and question 
were clearly stated with the framework of analysis pointing at regime theory 
and international law. Reasons for that was to establish a link between 
terrorism, regime change and international law, because some scholars and 
experts believe that the solution for terrorism lies in a criminal justice 
approach. The effectiveness of regime theory in understanding the 
phenomenon of terrorism was also explored. 
The literature review was conducted in an infinite manner for the mere fact 
that terrorism is an emerging and contemporary phenomenon. Information 
changes on a daily basis and continuous knowledge is dispatch due to the 
evolving nature of the topic. As part of the literature, there was an in-depth 
assessment of terrorist activities in the North, West and East Africa with a 
focus on the reasons that makes ISIS dangerous, the factors that lead to the 
rise of Boko Haram and the underlining reasons why individuals join Al-
Shabaab.  
Incorporating the aforementioned was the fundamental origins of the 
financing of terrorism activities on the continent. In this section, which formed 
the backbone of the research, an in-depth analysis was done on the different 
forms, strategies and techniques that terrorist groups (see Figure 4: Key 
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Terrorist Groups in Africa in Appendix page 122) uses to finance their activities 
in North, West and East Africa.  
Lastly, there was an evaluation of the current counter measures on the 
financing of terrorism on the African Continent on the continent in order to 
ascertain whether these counter measures are effective in meeting their 
objectives by evaluating the counter-terrorist strategies from the UNSC, the 
AU and other regional initiatives.  
During the qualitative research process and in the application of the research 
design and strategy, the sample collection, data collection and validation, 
various limitations were identified.   
The general conclusions are that international and local regimes can and do 
make a difference. Although often in conjunction with a number of other 
factors, a strategy of combined tools can help improve the understanding of 
the determinants of success. This is evident in the West’s ability to contain 
ISIS. According to Liang (2015) the perception of the West about ISIS in that 
it is a rogue state and nothing more, is the reason why they are not successful 
in combating its activities. ISIS is now a real, emerging and unrecognised 
state actor. It does not operate out of a safe haven within a sponsored state, 
but has become a de facto state that provides a safe haven for terrorist. They 
are ruthlessly and mercilessly administrating a territory. Additional to that, 
they have also become a successful criminal enterprise, which prevented the 
West from impeding the financial gains which are market by a fluidity and 
wealth never seen before by a terrorist group.  
This research confirmed the identified correlates and drivers for terrorism, 
namely political violence, the safety and security environment within a 
country, the lack of respect for human rights and for international 
organisations also influence terrorism, the driver in wealthier countries differ 
from those in poorer countries (Global Terrorism Report, 2015).  
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The terrorism trends identified by the Global Terrorism Index of 2015 are 
private citizens who increasingly becoming targets of terrorist attacks, 
terrorist attacks linked to religious targets accounts for 11% fewer deaths 
than in 2014, and two groups are mainly responsible for half the deaths from 
terrorism – Boko Haram and ISIS. Nigeria experienced the largest increase 
in deaths from terrorism since 2014, ISIS causes more deaths on the battle 
field than with terrorist attacks, the flow of foreign fighters continue to flow 
into Iraq and Syria and a significant percentage (21) of these foreign fighters 
comes from Europe.  
One of the common observation with solving problems and more generally, 
promoting sustainability in co-operation and coordination relations, is that 
governance systems work relatively well at the national level but poorly or not 
at all in efforts to solve international, transnational, and especially, global 
problems.  Although the state is a positive force in managing resources and 
regulation in domestic settings, the anarchic character of international 
society, treated as a society of sovereign states, constitutes a barrier to 
successful governance at the international level. However, both elements of 
this argument are open to question. Failures to tackle problems effectively, 
are common not only in societies facing severe problems of poverty and hunger 
or saddled with the curse of natural resources, but also in advanced industrial 
societies.  
Some regimes matter in the sense that they make a (sometimes sizable) 
difference not only in terms of outputs and outcomes but also in terms of 
solving the problems that lead to their creation. Anarchic character of 
international society is not always an obstacle to the capacity of regimes to 
contribute to problem solving. Regime design is often a more significant 
determinant of effectiveness than some measure of whether the problem is 
benign (i.e. easy to solve) or malign (i.e. hard to solve). Sizable proportion of 
the success of regimes is attributable to activities that are not regulatory in 
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the ordinary sense. Regimes are dynamic in the sense that they change 
continually after their initial formation. Success of regimes is highly sensitive 
to contextual factors. Active participation on the part of a single dominant 
actor (commonly known as a hegemon) is not a necessary condition for success 
in solving international environmental problems. Success in the 
implementation of international regimes is likely to require the establishment 
and maintenance of maximum winning coalitions rather than minimum 
winning coalitions. Maintenance of feelings of fairness and legitimacy is 
important to effectiveness, especially in cases where success requires active 
participation on the part of the members of the group over time. Casting 
arrangements in the form of legally binding conventions or treaties do not 
ensure higher levels of compliance on the part of subjects (Young, 2011).  
Arrangements featuring private governance and hybrid systems 
encompassing both public and private elements can solve some types of 
security problems. Multiple pathways may lead to success in efforts to solve 
many security problems. Institutional interplay is just as likely to produce 
positive or even synergistic results as it is to lead to interference between or 
among regimes. There is generally scope for resolving actual or potential 
conflicts between regimes through negotiations leading to mutual 
accommodation rather than by subordinating one regime to the other. Regime 
complexes offer a way forward in situations that do not lend themselves to the 
creation of a single integrated governance system. 
Berry (in Moran et al, 2008) brings a very important aspect to the fore; the 
question of terrorism and political violence insurance covering physical loss or 
damages to property in the emerging markets. This is one area of neglect in 
the insurance industry, in fact many insurance companies does not cover 
damages due to political violence, terrorism and protest action. Reasons 
provided for this current situation is the fact that the political risk investment 
insurance market is not in a good state, the stand-alone terrorism insurance 
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market has grown dramatically since 9/11 and is further fuelled by the 
decision of general insurers and reinsurers to exclude terrorism from their 
general insurance policies. In an attempt to provide solutions to this challenge 
the following should be considered (Berry in Moran et al, 2008:13). 
Emerging markets, as is the case with the majority of states in Africa, cannot 
separate terrorism form war risk and or political risk; insurance brokers may 
never consider effective terrorism insurance within their general insurance 
policies; based on the definition of terrorism – which is a challenge on its own 
– the wording should focus on the elements of the act in order to ensure 
effective cover for insurance against terrorism; lastly, the insurance industry 
should consider specialist in the terrorism field to assist with the 
accommodation of terrorist insurance for assets in the emerging markets and 
state infrastructure (Berry in Moran et la (2008:26).  
Substantial structures need to be put in place for states to be able to 
consolidate resolutions of security problems. The success on resolving that 
problem depends on the problem structure, meaning the way the problem is 
constituted, have a major impact on how the problem will be addressed and 
resolved. The role of power as a determinant of regime effectiveness is complex 
and contested, especially if we construe power to encompass soft as well as 
hard power, cognitive as well as structural power, and issue-specific as well 
as general power.  
This is demonstrated by ISIS in that it possesses its own means of income 
generation and financing. So far the US and its allies are losing the war 
against ISIS with a deterioration of the geopolitical situation in the affected 
regions. For as long as ISIS holds territory, the more plausible is its caliphate 
and its accompanying political, ideological, social and economical pretensions 
become (Liang, 2015:79). 
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Critics of regime analysis have sometimes dismissed institutions as 
epiphenomena that reflect underlying distributions of power and that change 
as these distributions shift. The study of regimes sometimes seem to ignore or 
at least, marginalize the role of power as a determinant of the capacity of these 
arrangements to solve problems.  
How can we come to terms with these diverging perspectives on the role of 
power?  
Regimes are embedded in overarching political orders, and they reflect the 
general principles of political discourses dominant at the time of their 
creation. However, this finding does not mean that they are of no significance 
in their own right, especially when treated as intervening forces that form 
links between the underlying drivers of human behaviour and the outcomes 
flowing from human-environment interactions. What we need to know here is 
how to think about the role of power as a driving force in world affairs that 
does not blind us to the significance of other forces.  
Participation versus depth also plays a critical role in the participants of 
regime change. Some state participate for the sake of compliance, while other 
states focus on fairness and legitimacy in the implementation of programs and 
policies. Despite the finding reported in the preceding section, there is 
substantial variation in the views that analysts have expressed regarding the 
roles of fairness and legitimacy as determinants of the effectiveness of 
international regimes. This divergence is not peculiar to the analysis of 
governance systems or regimes. It mirrors a larger and ongoing debate about 
the role of normative considerations as driving forces in global society. We do 
not need to resolve this overarching debate in analysing the effectiveness of 
international regimes. This depends largely on the policy instruments that 
are being used to support implementation.  
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Interplay management is a new concept and phenomenon. Institutional 
interplay is on the rise. Whatever the attractions of creating comprehensive 
and integrated governance systems to address security problems like 
terrorism, human trafficking and other transnational crimes, we must 
prepare for a world that features rising levels of interplay between and among 
distinct regimes.  
This adds to the nonlinearity of some state. This refers to a regime that 
changes too readily and therefore, lacks resilience and cannot be effective. 
However, a regime that is too rigid in the sense that it is unresponsive to major 
changes in the socioecological environment will be vulnerable to forces leading 
to institutional collapse in a world in which nonlinear changes are common. 
The scale, in this context, is a matter of the generalisability of findings 
regarding the effectiveness of governance systems across levels of social 
organisation. 
However, governments, faced with extremist threats tend to respond by 
restricting these activities in the name of restoring order – often with 
counterproductive effects. He cites the decision by the Tunisian government 
to shut down 80 mosques shortly after the attack on Sousse. “It will likely feed 
perceptions of grievance and push militants to operate underground,” says Dr 
Noureddine Jebnoun, a Professor of North Africa Studies at the Africa Center.  
The literature in the field of financing of terrorism clearly indicated that 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism became a global problem 
that does not just threaten the destabilisation of the global financial system, 
but will also directly or indirectly affect the economic prosperity of nations. 
The need for building effective regimes and cooperation with other nations in 
the combatting of money laundering and the financing of terrorism is 
increasingly becoming a factor that countries cannot ignore. The effectiveness 
of Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Financing of Terrorism is highly 
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depending on strong regimes and stakeholders with strong partnerships 
(McDowell, 2004:1). 
These stakeholders includes policymakers, judicial authorities, law 
enforcement agencies, financial intelligence units, financial regulatory and 
supervisory authorities, financial institutions, non-bank financial 
institutions, international and regional organisations, oversight agencies and 
financial institutions have a critical role to play in these efforts. In an attempt 
to coordinate these efforts, the FATF had a number of recommendations 
suggested to expand the scope of covered institutions, professions and 
predicated offences. These recommendations incorporated CFT preventative 
measures and international cooperation. The toughest challenge for 
government officials and financial institutions remained is to work closely 
together to comply with the international standards (McDowell, 2004:1). 
But who set or determine these standards? 
The importance of strengthening the consultative and collaborative process is 
very important and this resulted into a series of policy dialogues between 
selective stakeholders. These dialogues provided a platform where they could 
share experiences from developing, implementing and supervising AML/CFT 
regimes, with a specific emphasises on the importance of effective consultative 
mechanism between the public and the private sector to build and maintain a 
solid AML/CFT regime. McDowell (2004:2) makes an assumption that strong 
public-private partnerships and increased dialogue improves decision 
making, especially when authorities understand local conditions and 
circumstances and the private sector grasps the AML/CFT regime’s 
implementation requirements. This dialogue presented a unique opportunity 
to identify ten lessons learned about private-public partnerships. 
Additional to the above Chatain et al (2009:25) highlights that it is in their 
efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing that banks can 
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approach the management of risks either from an individual bank perspective 
or the perspective of the person who supervises the processes within the 
systems of the bank. The specific risks that banks that are inherent in money 
laundering and terrorist financing are compliance and legal aspects, 
reputation, operational and transactional risks, strategic risk and liquidity. 
In many cases these risks are intertwined. A risk assessment remain a crucial 
instrument in the risk management processes of which the first step is to 
understand the main types of criminal activity likely to generate proceeds that 
could be a subject of money laundering. Furthermore, it is important to 
identify these processes and activities in different locations and 
circumstances, as they may differ from bank to bank, nabouring countries 
with similar products and services, customers and locations.  Vulnerable areas 
are products, services, customers (both natural and legal) and geographical 
location (Chatain et al (2009:25).   
The lessons learned were found to be important for actors to display 
commitment and political will, establish a national coordinating group, 
establish an implementation working group, issue clear rules, regulations and 
guidance notes, launch public awareness campaigns, build trust, develop 
consultative forums, forge public-private partnerships with Financial 
Intelligence Units and reporting entities, develop a feedback mechanism and 
lastly, establish an ongoing training facility for both public and private sectors 
to ensure that the mechanisms that has been out in place stays in place, 
therefore ensuring continuity. This set of best practices is intended to 
accomplish and help jurisdictions develop and implement domestic systems 
that are compatible with international AML/CFT standards, to serve as a 
benchmark when countries develop internal consultative processes and lastly, 
to guide the efforts of the public and private sectors to build stronger 
AML/CFT regimes. As much as these elements are essential in strengthening 
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an AML/CFT regime, they will not be sufficient by themselves McDowell 
(2004:3). 
When looking at the strides that have been made on the African continent, it 
is impossible to do research on the combating of the financing of terrorism 
without referring to the case of Egypt. Egypt is arguably one of the countries 
on the continent with the most significant progress with regards to 
formulating and implementing counter measures. This country established a 
history of policies and operational procedures to address terrorism. The 
implementation of counter measures related to the financing of terrorism is 
supported by a comprehensive and effective structure of domestic and 
international coordination. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, The 
Central Bank of Egypt and Public Protector’s Office are all organs that form 
a united front against this phenomenon and implementing the different 
strategies (Country of Origin Information Report, 2009:24).  
In the view of this threat, extensive powers were given to the above 
departments in an attempt to deal with money-laundering, drug-trafficking, 
weapons of mass destruction, the trafficking of humans and human organs, 
illegal trafficking and trading of antiquities and forgery link to immigration 
purposes. Crimes related to weapon trading showed a sharp decline since 
2005, which can be assigned to sterner transnational restrictions. Another 
factor can also be assigned the fact that terrorist groups does not travel with 
weapons, but recruit members in countries where they want to launch attacks. 
This makes it easier on the part of the terrorist group to obtain weapons and 
explosives, because they need not to cross borders with it, but obtain it in the 
country where the attack will take place (Country of Origin Information 
Report, 2009:24). Corruption, bribery, theft and the misappropriation of funds 
are well on the increase and this can also be assigned to the financing of 
terrorism, as it is relatively easier to send money around than weapons or 
explosives. 
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Establishing inclusive governance processes that create trust between 
government institutions and citizens should be a key piece in combating 
violent extremism explains Hussein Solomon. “You cannot fix the problem of 
terrorism without fixing the state,” he suggests. “A new social contract needs 
to be established between the political leader and citizens, one that includes 
and respects ethnic and religious diversities and where citizens feel that they 
belong to the nation. However, African political elites thus far have resisted 
this. What then emerges is a corrupt and predatory state which creates more 
cleavages in society than it can ameliorate. This creates an environment for 
radical organizations to take root as happened in Nigeria, Northern Mali, and 
Somalia” (Solomon, 2013:3). Addressing these fundamental weaknesses of the 
African state should be viewed by international and African partners as vital 
to national as well as international security, he argues (Solomon, 2013:3).  
Liang (2015:79) mention that the way the international community need to 
respond to these challenges should be based on three pillars: military, markets 
and messaging. Even though the military has an important role to play, it is 
quite evident that these techniques are not effective. Air campaigns is having 
limited effects and the drone campaign is reported to create multiple civilian 
casualties that actually continue to help terrorist recruiting new fighters. 
Markets need to be destroyed in order to address the ability to generate funds. 
A simple principle of demand and supply. Due to the mafia element in the 
structures of terrorist groups, it simply allows for messages to be send back 
and forth without the risk of being identified, due to coding and propaganda.  
Changes are also required in the way military operations are carried out. 
Nigeria’s heavy-handed approach to dealing with Boko Haram contributed to 
radicalizing the group over time. It started out in 2002 as a religious sect but 
as time went on it clashed frequently with police. The tipping point came in 
2009 after a violent encounter with police triggered five days of riots in 
Bauchi, later spreading to Borno, Yobe, and Kano states. These ended after 
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its founder was captured and killed in police custody. The group went into 
hiding, emerging several months later as an armed insurgency. A lot can be 
learned from this experience explains Sodipo (2015): “For security operations 
to be more effective, government forces should invest in building credibility 
and gaining trust among local communities.” 
This is also concurred by Liang (2015:79), that some of these measures seem 
to be working. As much as the countering of finances have limit the operations 
of some of these terrorist groups, it has also empower them to think about 
alternative ways to finance their activities.  
Terrorism can only be stopped if there is a whole-of-society holistic approach 
to counter radicalisation, including not only governments, but political 
parties, civil society and especially community and religious leaders. On an 
international level the different organisation like the AU and the UN need to 
re-assess the link between insurgency and counter efforts, in order to ensure 
that on a local level a firm politico-military foundation is established before 
any large scale counter measures is attempted; strategic bases should be 
established with an emphasis on rural as well as urban areas included, the 
population need to be mobilised in support of the government’s counter 
measures;  an effective administration with the focus on the welfare of the 
people must be establish to ensure transparency; active participation from all 
stakeholders and should specifically focus on elements that may oppose the 
initiatives; a national program should be developed for the future of the 
country and that should be backed by the required resources in order to ensure 
that no external funders influence the objectives of the country (McCuen, 
1996:3) This is also  supported by the UNSC resolution 2178, which helps to 
mobilise the international community to design better solutions to counter 
violent extremism, of which terrorism is part of.  
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Appendices A: Maps 
Figure 1: Terrorism in North Africa & Sahel in 2012: Global Research and implications 
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Figure 2: Challenges to US Diplomacy: Dealing with Terrorism and Instability in the Horn of Africa-
Strategic Thinking on East Africa 
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Figure 3: Militant Spheres of Influence 
 
Source: Maplecroft, 2014 
Figure 4: Key Terrorist Groups in Africa 
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Figure 5: Global Terrorist Hotspots Mapped (2014) 
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Figure 6: Islamist Militants Groups and their areas of influence in Africa 
Source: Strafor, BBC Somali Service/Monitoring 
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Figure 7: Growth of Terror: Since its formation as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2-13, it has 
conquered regions of Iraq, Syria and recently Libya 
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Figure 8: Islamist factions active in Africa
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Figure 9: ISIS main source of income
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Figure 10: Boko Haram fatal attacks
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Figure 11: Trans-Sahara trafficking and threat finance-22 April 2015
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Figure 12: Nigerian Map: Education, Governance, Peace and Security 
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